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RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES IN
ADMINISTRATIVE RULE MAKING IN WEST
VIRGINIAt
ALFRED S. NEELY, IV*

I.

INTRODUCTION

In 1976 the West Virginia Legislature amended the West Virginia Administrative Procedure Act for the first time since its passage in 1964.1 The 1976 Amendments are significant in their impact on the manner in which state agencies must develop and
adopt administrative rules and regulations. One noteworthy feature of the new law is the provision for establishment of a state
register for routine publication of administrative rules and regulations in proposed as well as final form.2 Equally important are the
new provisions for formal legislative review of administrative
rules.3 A Legislative Rule-making Review Committee has been created within the Legislature with primary responsibility in the first
instance for approval of agency rules. 4 Its potential influence on
rule making in the State is considerable.
t Copyright 0 Alfred S. Neely, IV 1977.
* Assistant Professor of Law, West Virginia University College of Law; A.B.,
1963, Yale University; LL.B. 1966, Harvard University.
Acts of the 62nd W. Va. Leg; ch. 117, Reg. Sess. (1976), amending and
reenactingW. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 29A-3-1 to -7 (1976 Replacement Vol.) [originally
enacted as Acts of the 56th W. Va. Leg. ch. 1, §§ 29A-3-1 to -7, Reg. Sess. (1964)]
(codified at W. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 29A-3-1 to -15 (1976 Replacement Vol.)) [hereinafter referred to as the 1976 Amendments]. Other aiticles in the original enactment have not been amended (codified at W. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 29A-1-1 to -2-2,
-4-1 to -7-4 (1976 Replacement Vol.)) These articles, including article three, as
originally enacted, hereinafter are referred to as the 1964 Act.
2 W. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 29A-3-4, -7, -10 (1976 Replacement Vol.).
W. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 29A-3-10, -11 (1976 Replacement Vol.).
W. VA. CODE ANN. § 29A-3-10 (1976 Replacement Vol.).
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Both the recent amendments and, to a lesser extent, the 1964
Administrative Procedure Act itself reflect an unambiguous legislative commitment to effective public participation in administrative rule-making. The Legislature's objective in this regard has
been to insure that West Virginia administrative agencies not be
permitted the luxury of conducting their rule-making activities
insulated from public sentiment and views. To that end the Legislature has made available to the public and to the Legislature itself
various opportunities for control of agency rulemaking through
participation in the process by which rules and regulations are
promulgated.
The 1976 Amendments are not unprecedented; they are consistent with widely accepted principles and policies of administrative law. Many states provide for centralized publication of administrative rules and regulations,5 often under the auspices of the
Secretary of State. This was the case in West Virginia as early as
1964.6 There is considerable variation in requirements concerning
the frequency of publication, but a number of states provide for
frequent publication or supplementation on a routine basis comparable to that now prescribed for the West Virginia state register.7
5 ALASKA

STAT. §§ 44.62.130, .140, .160 (1962); CAL. STATE Gov'T. CODE ANN. §

11409 (Supp. 1977); CoLo. REV. STAT. § 24-4-103 (11) (1973); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§ 4-173 (Supp. 1977); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 120.55 (Supp. 1977); GA. CODE ANN. § 3A107 (1975); IND. ANN. CODE §§ 4-22-2-7 to -9 (1974); IOWA CODE ANN. § 17A.6 (Supp.
1977); KAN. STAT. §§ 77-427, -430 (Supp. 1976); Ky. REV. STAT. § 13.096 (Supp.
1976); LA. REv. STAT. § 49:954.1 (Supp. 1977); ME. REV. STAT. tit. 5, § 2353 (1964);
MD. ANN. CODE. art.41, § 256C (Supp. 1976); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 30A, § 6 (1973);
MICH. STAT. ANN. § 3.560 (146) (Supp. 1977); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 15.051 (1977);

Miss. CODE ANN. § 25-43-11 (Supp. 1977); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 536.031 (Supp. 1977);
MONT. REv. CODES ANN. § 82-4206 (Supp. 1975); N. H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 541-A:5
(Supp. 1973); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:14B-7 (Supp. 1976); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 4-32-6

(1974); N.Y. EXEc. LAWS § 160 (McKinney Supp. 1975); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150A63 (Supp. 1975); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 75, §§ 255, 256 (1976); OR. REV. STAT. §
183.360 (1975); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 45, §§ 701-702 (Special Pamphlet 1977); R.I.
GEN. LAWS § 42-35-5 (1969); S.C. CODE §§ 1-16, -17 (1962); S.D. COMPILED LAWS
ANN. § 1-26A-1 (Supp. 1977); TENN. CODE ANN. § 4-502 (Supp. 1976); TEX. REv.
Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-13a, § 6 (Supp. 1976); UTAH CODE ANN. § 63-46-7 (Supp.
1977); VT. STAT. ANN. tit 3, §§ 804, 805 (Supp. 1977); VA. CODE § 9-6.19 (Supp.
1976); WASH. REV. CODE § 34.04.050 (1967); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 35.93 (West Supp.
1977); Wyo. STAT. § 9-276.23 (Supp. 1975). The laws of the District of Columbia

and Puerto Rico have similar provisions. D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 1-1504, 1507, 1602
(Supp. El 1976); P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 3, § 1054 (1965).
Acts of the 56th W. Va. Leg. ch. 1, § 29A-3-7, Reg. Sess. (1964).
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 4-173 (Supp. 1976); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 120,54, .55
(Supp. 1976); IOWA CODE ANN. § 17A.6 (Supp. 1976); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13.096
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Furthermore, many states require publication of proposed as well
as final agency rules in the central register.' At the national level,
the Federal Register, now in its fifth decade, provides comparable
information from a single source.' Likewise, legislative review is
not uncommon. Over twenty states now have statutes providing for
some form of formal legislative review of agency rule making which
goes beyond the traditional legislative techniques for control of
administrative action.'" It is clear, therefore, that the need for
MD. ANN. CODE art. 41, §
256C (Supp. 1976); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 30A, § 6 (1973); MICH. STAT. ANN.
§ 3.560 (155,156) (Supp. 1977); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 15.051 (West 1977 Replacement
Vol.); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 536.015 (Supp. 1976); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 82-4206
(Supp. 1975); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:14B-7 (Supp. 1976); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 4-32-6
(1974); N.Y. EXEC. § 160 (McKinney Supp. 1976); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 75, § 255
(1976); OR. REV. STAT. § 183.360 (1975); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 45, § 724 (Special
Pamphlet 1977); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 4-502, 510 (Supp. 1976); TEX. REv. Crv.
STAT. ANN. art. 6252-13a, § 6 (Supp. 1976); UTAH CODE ANN. § 63-46-7 (Supp. 1977);
WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 34.04.050 (1965); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 35.93 (Supp. 1977).
See also D.C. CODE ANN. § 1-1504 (Supp. 1I 1976); P.R. LAWS ANN. §§ 1053, 1054
(1965).
8 CAL. Gov'T CODE § 11409 (Supp. 1976); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 24-4-103 (3)
(1973); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 4-168 (Supp. 1976); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 120.54 (1)
(Supp. 1976); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 27, § 1007 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1977) requires the
Secretary of State to maintain a weekly bulletin service for notice of proposed rule
making, even though the responsibility for publication of final rules rests with the
agencies. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 127, § 1007 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1977); IOWA CODE ANN.
§ 17A.5 (Supp. 1976); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13.085 (Supp. 1976); LA. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 49:953 (Supp. 1976); MD. ANN. CODE art. 41, § 245 (Supp. 1976); MIN. STAT.
ANN. § 15.0412 (Replacement Vol. 1976); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 5 536.021 (Supp. 1976);
MONT. REv. CODES ANN. § 82-4204 (Supp. 1975); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:14B-4 (1970);
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 75, § 303 (1976); OR. REv. STAT. § 183.335 (1975); PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 45, § 724-725 (Special Pamphlet 1977); S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN. § 1-264.1 (Supp. 1977); TENN. CODE ANN. § 4-530 (Supp. 1976); TEX. REV. Cirv. STAT. ANN.
art. 6252-13a, § 5 (Supp. 1976); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 63-46-5, -7 (Supp. 1977); Wis.
STAT. ANN. § 227-021 (West 1957); See also D.C. CODE ANN. § 1-1505 (Supp. Ill
1976).
9 44 U.S.C. §§ 1501-1511 (1970) (originally enacted as Act of July 26, 1935, ch.
417, 49 Stat. 500).
1*ALASKA STAT. § 44.62.320 (1962); ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 6-610 to -612 (1976);
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 4-170, -171 (Supp. 1976); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 11.60, 120.54
(Supp. 1976); IDAHO CODE §§ 67-5217, 5218 (Supp. 1977); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 17A.4
(4), .8 (Supp. 1976); KAN. STAT. § 77-426 (Supp. 1976); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. §§
13.085, .087 (Supp. 1976); MD. ANN. CODE art. 40, § 40A (Supp 1976); MICH. STAT.
ANN. §§ 3.560 (135), (145) (Supp. 1977); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 3.965 (1976 Replacement Vol.); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 536.037 (Supp. 1976); MONT. REv. CODES ANN. §
82.4203.1-.5 (Supp. 1975); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 84-904, -908 (Cum. Supp. 1976);
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 75, § 308 (1976); OR. REv. STAT. §§ 171.707-.713 (1975); S.D.
COMPILED LAWS ANN. § 1-26-1.1 (Supp. 1977); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 3, §§ 817-819

(Supp. 1976); LA. REV. STAT. § 49: 954.1 (Supp. 1976);
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public participation and legislative control in administrative rule
making has been recognized and met in similar ways elsewhere.
Legislative activity at the state and federal levels concerning
the way in which administrative agencies are to conduct their affairs is but one manifestation of a phenomenon which has attracted the attention of many in this century, and for good reason.
Twenty-five years ago Mr. Justice Jackson observed, "The rise of
administrative bodies probably has been the most significant legal
trend of the last century and perhaps more values today are affected by their decisions than by those of all the courts, review of
administrative decisions apart."" This trend has not developed
without criticism, and on occasion courts have found that the delegation of law-making and policy tasks to administrative bodies has
exceeded constitutional boundaries."2 The exigencies of government in an increasingly complex society, however, have supported
and, indeed, required growth in the technique of policy and decision making through administrative bodies. 3 In West Virginia, the
propriety of delegation of authority to administrative agencies has
been recognized for some time, 4 subject to the caveat that the
administrator must act within his delegated powers." The result
has been extensive reliance in West Virginia, as elsewhere, on the
(Supp. 1977); WASH. Rav. CODE ANN. § 34.04.160 (1965); Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 13.56,

.565 (Supp. 1976); see Note, A Survey of PrincipalProceduralElements Among
State Administrative ProcedureActs, 22 CLEV. ST. L. Rav. 281, 285-87 (1973).

FTC v. Ruberoid Co., 343 U.S. 470, 487 (1952) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
Schecter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935); See Panama
Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935). These, however, have been the only cases
"

12

in which a congressional delegation of power has been declared unconstitutional by

the Supreme Court. Subsequent cases have upheld broad delegations of authority
to administrative agencies. B. ScsiwARTz, ADMINISTRATW LAw 39-47 (1976)
[hereinafter cited as ScHwAmrz].
12 See Schwartz, The Administrative Process and CongressionalControl, 16

FED. B. J. 519, 520-21 (1956).
11State ex rel. West Virginia Housing Dev. Fund v. Copenhaver, 153 W. Va.
636, 649-51, 171 S.E.2d 545, 553 (1969); Quesenberry v. Estep, 142 W. Va. 426, 44145, 95 S.E.2d 832, 841-44 (1956); see Meisel v. Tri-State Airport Authority, 135 W.
Va. 528, 545, 64 S.E.2d 32, 41-42 (1951); Frampton v. Consolidated Bus Lines, Inc.,

134 W. Va. 815, 829, 62 S.E.2d 126, 138-39 (1950); State ex rel. Morris v. West
Virginia Racing Comm., 133 W. Va. 179, 192-93, 55 S.E.2d 263, 271 (1949); West

Central Producers Co-Operative Ass'n v. Comm'r of Agriculture, 124 W. Va. 81, 8790, 20 S.E.2d 797, 801-03 (1942); 47 W. VA. L.Q. 145 (1940-41).
25

See Tulley v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 345 F. Supp. 1123 (S.D.W.

Va. 1972).
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administrative agency as a vital element in the process of government. 11
Acceptance of the reality and necessity of administrative government did not spawn complacency. Rather, it produced an
awareness that administrative institutions, too vital to avoid, were
too important to leave uncontrolled. This was recognized at an
early date, as reflected in the remarks of Elihu Root in his Presidential Address to the American Bar Association in 1916:
We are entering upon the creation of a body of administrative
law quite different in its machinery, its remedies and its necessary safeguards from the old methods of regulation by specific
statutes enforced by the courts. As any community passes from
simple to complex conditions the only way in which government
can deal with the increased burdens thrown upon it is by the
delegation of power to be exercised in detail by subordinate
agents, subject to the control of general directions prescribed by
superior authority. The necessities of our situation have already
led to an extensive employment of that method. .

.

. There will

be no withdrawal from these experiments. We shall go on; we
shall expand them, whether we approve theoretically or not,
because such agencies furnish protection to rights and obstacles
to wrong doing which under our new social and industrial conditions cannot be practically accomplished by the old and simple
procedure of legislatures and courts as in the last generation.
Yet the powers that are committed to these regulating agencies,
and which they must have to do their work, carry with them
great and dangerous opportunities of oppression and wrong. If
we are to continue a government of limited powers these agencies of regulation must themselves be regulated. The limits of
their power over the citizen must be fixed and determined. The
rights of the citizen against them must be made plain. A system
of administrative law must be developed,
and that with us is
7
still in its infancy, crude and imperfect.
This challenge of regulating the regulators and devising fair and
effective means for their control has been central to developments
in administrative law, and efforts to meet this challenge focused
principally on matters of procedure." Emphasis on administrative
procedure is now common-place, with considerable reliance placed
,1 See Davis, Judicial Review of Administrative Action in West Virginia-A
Study in Separation of Powers, 44 W. VA. L.Q. 270, 270-71 (1938).
" Root, Public Service by the Bar, 2 A.B.A.J. 736, 749-50 (1916).
,BSee Schwartz, supra note 13, at 520-21, 531.
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upon administrative procedure legislation to delineate pathways
for the administrative process. The Federal Administrative Procedure Act is an example which readily comes to mind,'" but today
most states also have comprehensive administrative procedure
acts.2" These laws are by no means the sole sources of control over
administrative action, yet their fundamental nature and wide
ranging application do reveal a general legislative commitment to
control through procedural requirements.
Devotion to control of administrative agencies and selection of
procedural safeguards as a means of achieving control, however, do
not guarantee its realization. Administrators charged with massive
and often overwhelming duties may not always share the concern
of legislators, lawyers and others as to how a decision should be
reached. Sometimes, the immediate object of the administrator's
interest is to determine what is to be decided, or whether to make
a decision at all, and not the procedural requirements of the decision making process. Most administrative procedure legislation
takes these possibilities into account and provides negative incentives to encourage compliance. The ultimate sanction imposed
under some circumstances is invalidation of the administrator's
actions. 2'
Considering the obviously ambitious scope of a comprehensive
administrative procedure act and the equally ambitious array of
tasks with which administrative agencies have been entrusted, no
single set of procedural devices is uniformly suitable for all. Law,
logic and practicality preclude this. Fortunately, some degree of
general delineation is possible, depending on the nature of the
particular activity undertaken by an agency. Thus, legislatures
have distinguished those situations where an agency acts in a manner comparable to a legislature from those where it acts in a man" 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-59, 701-06 (-1970 & Supp. IV 1974) (originally enacted as
Act of June 11, 1946, ch. 324, 60 Stat. 237).
2 What constitutes a comprehensive administrative procedure act is not necessarily susceptible to precise definition. However, even if one assumes that an act
must cover rule making, adjudication, and judicial review in order to qualify as
comprehensive, by 1975 over half of the states had such statutes. Bonfield, The
Iowa Administration Procedure Act: Background, Construction, Applicability,
Public Access to Agency Law, The Rulemaking Process, 60 IowA L. Rv. 731, 74647 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Bonfield]. And as of 1970, about thirty-six states
had general legislation in one or more areas of administrative law. K. DAvis, ADMINisTRATIWE LAW TRErIsE, § 1.04-5 (Supp. 1970).
' See W. VA. CoDa ANN. § 29A-3-3 (1976 Replacement Vol.).
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ner comparable to a court, and devised different procedures for
each. In the Federal Administrative Procedure Act, Congress attempted to separate administrative rule making from administrative adjudication.22 The same line is drawn in West Virginia, although the Legislature selected the term "contested case" rather
than adjudication to characterize agency activities of a judicial
nature.2
This article deals with the rule-making function of administrative agencies in West Virginia. Rule making has been character''
ized as "one of the greatest inventions of modern government,"
and it is this aspect of administrative procedure which recently
attracted the attention of the West Virginia Legislature and culminated in the 1976 Amendments. It is an area in which there is
relatively little ambiguity concerning the desire and intent of the
Legislature. Unfortunately, it is also one in which policies have
been enunciated with greater enthusiasm than that with which
they have been implemented. This article will explore the nature
and scope of the rule-making function of West Virginia administrative agencies and the responsibilities in connection with rule making which have been assigned to various institutions of government, including the Legislature, the Secretary of State, and the
agencies themselves. The closely related rights of the public to
participate in the rule-making process will also be examined.
Following consideration of the basic structure of the rulemaking process in West Virginia and related rights and responsibilities, attention will be shifted to the consequences which flow
from inadequate implementation and performance of rule-making
responsibilities prescribed by the Legislature. There is evidence in
West Virginia with regard to the latter aspect that all that should
have been done has not been done, thus raising serious questions
of law and policy with regard to the validity and propriety of the
current rules and regulations of numerous West Virginia agencies.
Unearthing problems alone does not guarantee their resolution. Consequently, this article presents some suggestions for eliminating present shortcomings and insuring the integrity and utility
of the rule-making process, a task which requires the cooperation
and vigilance of no single group or institution, but rather that of
all institutions of government, the Bar and the public.

2
24

See 5 U.S.C. §§ 551(4), (5), (6), (7) (1970 & Supp. IV 1974).
See W. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 29A-1-1 (c), (e)(1976 Replacement Vol.).
K. DAvis, supra note 20, § 6.15 at 283 (Supp. 1970).
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I. DETERMINING THE APPLICABILITY OF THE RULE-MAKING
PRINCIPLES AND PROCEDURES OF THE WEST VIRGINIA ADMINISTRATIVE
PROCEDURE Acr

The determination of whether a specific act of government is
subject to the principles and procedures for administrative rule
making under the West Virginia Administrative Procedure Act is
primarily a process of exclusion." Reaching a conclusion on the
issue requires consideration of the source of the governmental activity, the subject matter of the activity, the agency's statutory
authority to make rules, and the nature of the activity.
A.

Application in Light of InstitutionalSource

The source of the activity is relevant because not all institutions and individuals in government are affected by the Act. It
applies to activities of an "agency," which is defined as "any state
board, commission, department or officer authorized by law to
make rules or adjudicate contested cases, except those in the legislative or judicial branches .. .."I' Only state boards, commis-

sions, departments or officers come within the definition, but the
limitation is deceptive in its simplicity. For example, the suggestion has been made that since there is no indication that the definition applies only to those having state-wide authority, it is possible

that local organizations, such as, a County Board of Health, having
statutory rule-making authority, are covered.- The Attorney General, however, has expressed the opinion that the Act was not
meant to apply to a local board of education." Similarly, it is
thought that cities, towns and counties are not affected by the Act
because of their representative capacity. 9 Clarification of the statute on these points would be useful, but for the present the key
seems to be whether the agency was created by State government
to exercise rule-making or adjudicatory powers."
1 The entire matter of applicability of the Act has provided ample opportunity
for confusion. See State ex reL Burchett v. Taylor, 150 W. Va. 702, 149 S.E.2d 234
(1966) (first case to come before the Supreme Court of Appeals under the 1964 Act).
"6 W. VA. CODE ANN. § 29A-1-1(a) (1976 Replacement Vol.).
" Harrison, The West Virginia Administrative ProcedureAct, 66 W. VA. L.
REV. 159, 165 (1964) [hereinafter cited as Harrison].
23 Op. W. Va. Att'y Gen., June 18, 1975.
Harrison, supra note 27, at p. 165.
1 COOPER, STATE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 97 (1965) [hereinafter cited as
COOPER].
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The legislative and judicial branches are also excluded from
the definition of "agency." This exception is derived from the first
tentative draft for revision of the Model State Administrative Procedure Act; however, the Model Act ultimately used the language
"other than the legislature or the courts,"31 out of concern that
"many administrative agencies in the exercise of a delegated legislative function may be considered as much in the legislative
branch as in the executive." 3 The language of the 1964 Act, however, does make clear that those in the legislative and judicial
branches are excluded, meaning that not only the Legislature and
courts themselves are outside the definition, but also those subordinate to them. Nevertheless, it has been suggested that agencies
subject to staffing by appointment of the Governor are "within the
executive department even though their responsibilities include
3
those of the other two branches, particularly the legislature."
Other institutions of State government are also exempt from
application of the Act, although not for all purposes. The exemption extends to the Board of Probation and Parole, the Public
Service Commission, the Board of Public Works, the West Virginia
Board of Education and the West Virginia Board of Regents."
There are, however, important features of rule-making procedure
which do apply to these agencies; their final rules, for example,
must be filed with the Secretary of State in order to become effective. All other procedural requirements relating to rule making
under the Act do not apply to them.
B. Application in Light of Subject Matter
Even though agency action constitutes rule making and is
initiated by one meeting the definition of agency, the Act is inapplicable if one of several general subject areas is involved. If an
agency is engaged in promulgation of a rule "relating to. .. public
elections, the conduct of inmates of public institutions, the con'

Harrison, supra note 27, at 166.

'

Id. at 165-66.

3 Id.

at 166.
W. VA. CODE ANN. § 29A-1-2 (1976 Replacement Vol.).
Id. The Workmen's Compensation Fund, the Department of Employment
Security, the State Tax Commissioner, the State Road Commissioner, the State
Road Commission, and the Teacher's Retirement Board are excepted from application of the requirements of the 1964 Act concerning contested cases. W. VA. CODE
'

ANN. § 29A-5-5 (1976 Replacement Vol.). These agencies are, however, subject to

rule-making procedures unless otherwise exempted. Harrison, supranote 27, at 167.
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duct of students at public schools or public educational institutions, the conduct of persons in military service or the receipt of
public assistance," it.may proceed without regard to conditions
otherwise imposed on the rule-making process."
C. Application in Light of Authority to Make Rules
Even though the institutional source of governmental activity
meets the definition of agency and the subject matter is not exempt, there is still another issue which requires consideration. In
the rule-making context, a state board, commission, department
or officer must be "authorized by law to make rules."37 "[B]efore
any agency is subject to the Act's provisions it must have statutory
authority to make rules or to adjudicate contested cases. The Act
applies only to the extent that either or both are exercised or required to be exercised and reference to specific statutes by which
an agency's authority is established is necessary." 38 Normally the
Legislature is explicit and makes an express delegation of rulemaking authority to administrative agencies. The State Road
Commissioner, for example, is required to dispose of obsolete and
surplus materials and is instructed to "adopt and promulgate rules
and regulations governing and controlling the disposition of all
such equipment, supplies and materials."39 This is a typical delegation of rule-making authority.
The requirement that rule making be authorized by law is
derived from the Revised Model Act and has been thought disadvantageous in that it would exempt "agencies authorized to affect
private rights only through means other than rule-making . . .
such as through informal action, investigation, negotiation, etc.""0
Furthermore, concern has been expressed that the "authorized by
law" language may preclude judicial review where an agency not
so authorized is attempting to make rules.4' In this light, Iowa and
apparently Wisconsin have deleted this language from their definitions."
Much of the potential difficulty is eliminated if the concept
"
n

W. VA. CODE ANN.
W. VA. CODE ANN.

§ 29A-1-2 (1976 Replacement Vol.).
§ 29A-l-l(a) (1976 Replacement Vol.).

Harrison, supra note 27, at 165.
§ 17-2A-14 (1974 Replacement Vol.).
4oBonfield, supra note 20, at 761.

33

3' W. VA. CODE ANN.

, Id. at 76f-62.
Id. at 762.

42
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of authorization by law is interpreted to include not only those
instances where there is an express delegation of rule-making authority, but also those where authorization may be reasonably
implied. It is recognized in West Virginia that "an administrative
agency possesses, in addition to the powers expressly conferred by
statute, such powers as are reasonably and necessarily implied in
the exercise of its duties .

. . ."I

It may be especially important

that implied rule-making authority be recognized in cases where
literal interpretation of the definition of agency otherwise would
exempt rule-making activities for failure to fall within the definition. The Act, for example, is intended to apply to interpretative
as well as substantive rules,44 but it would be unusual for a statute
to contain express rule-making authority for interpretative rules.
It is imperative that such authority be implied. Grappling with
powers by implication is by no means an easy task;45 yet this is
necessary to prevent artificial distinctions concerning coverage of
basic rule-making procedures.
D. Application in Light of the Nature of the Activity
The nature of the activity in relation to the concept of rule
making is an issue for further inquiry in determining the application of rule-making procedures to specific agency action. Only if
the activity constitutes rule making are rule-making procedures
applicable.
1. Rules and Contested Cases Contrasted
Under the West Virginia Administrative Procedure Act "rule
making" is defined as "the agency process for the formulation,
amendment or repeal of a rule," 6 thus establishing that the concept of rule making involves modification and abolition as well as
creation of rules. "Rule" is defined to include "every regulation,
standard, or statement of policy or interpretation of general application and future effect, including the amendment or repeal
" State Human Rights Comm. v. Pauley, 212 S.E.2d 77,78 (W. Va. 1975). See
Colvin v. State Workmen's Compensation Comm'r, 154 W. Va. 280, 289, 175 S.E.2d
186, 192. (1970).
W. VA. COD. ANN. § 29A-1-1(c) (1976 Replacement Vol.).
4'See COOPER, supra note 30, at 176-77.
46 W. VA. CODE ANN. § 29A-1-1(d) (1976 Replacement Vol.). The 1976 Amendments include a provision which establishes that the terms "rule" and "regulation"
are interchangeable for purposes of Art. 3 of the Act, as amended. W. VA. CODE ANN.
§ 29A-3-1 (1976 Replacement Vol.).
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thereof, affecting private rights, privileges or interests, or the procedures available to the public, adopted by an agency to implement, extend, apply, interpret or make specific the law enforced
or administered by it or to govern its organization or procedure
.
. 'N' The definition provided for by the Act, of "contested
case," is useful to an understanding of the range and limits of rule
making. Under the Act, the term "contested case," which relates
to agency functions judicial in nature, "means a proceeding before
an agency in which the legal rights, duties, interests or privileges
of specific parties are required by law or constitutional right to be
determined after an agency hearing,. . . and shall not include rule
making."4 The end product of the contested case process is an
"order" which is "the whole or any part of the final disposition
(whether affirmative, negative, injunctive or declaratory in form)
by any agency of any matter other than rule making."' 9 Comparison of these definitions reveals important contrasts which highlight the nature of rule making.
First, rules are of general application and, unlike contested
cases, are not limited to specific parties. The impact of a rule may
be significant on persons not involved whatsoever in a rule-making
proceeding and not even aware of it. This general application reflects the legislative nature of rule making. A contested case, on
the other hand, involves specific parties who themselves are directly affected and bound by the proceeding, and the effect of a
decision in a contested case on those not a party normally is limited to the degree to which the decision has value as precedent in
future adjudicatory proceedings."
Another feature of a rule under the Act is its future effect. The
requirement of future effect is perhaps unnecessary because one
would not expect a statement of general applicability to operate
4' W. VA. CODE ANN.
41 Id. § 29A-1-1(e).

§ 29A-1-1(c) (1976 Replacement Vol.).

Id. § 29A-1-1(f).
soThis contrast between rule making and the adjudication of contested cases
is illustrated by the following excerpt:
Unlike an administrative order or a court judgment adjudicating the
rights of individuals, which is binding only on the parties to the particular
proceeding, a valid exercise of the rule-making power is addressed to and
sets a standard of conduct for all to whom its terms apply. It operates as
such in advance of the imposition of sanctions upon any particular individual.
Columbia Broadcasting System v. United States, 316 U.S. 407, 418 (1942).
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other than prospectively, 5' yet it does serve to reinforce the idea
that rule making is legislative in nature. In contrast, the result in
the contested case usually will have retroactive consequences for
the specific parties to the proceeding.
Third, rule making does not involve an opportunity to be
heard in an agency hearing. The public in general has opportunities, prescribed by statute, to participate in the rule-making process. While an agency cannot deny fundamental opportunities to
participate in rule making, it may and usually does act without
formal hearing. The contested case involves situations where the
decision can be reached only on the basis of an agency hearing
required by either statute or constitution.
2.

Nature of Activities Within the Definition

Comparison of rule making and the contested case offers insights on the nature of rule making; however, it is the Act's definition of a "rule" which is the focal point for a determination of
whether specific government activity falls within the rule-making
category. The reach of the definition is considerable, and intentionally so. "Rule" includes "every regulation, standard, or statement of policy or interpretation .. . ."I' The effect of this language is to reduce the possibility of an agency avoiding the responsibilities of prescribed procedures simply by altering the form, but
not the substance of its actions. At one time, for example, a Michigan statute required a hearing for rules, but not for regulations,
adopted by the Michigan Unemployment Compensation Commission. During one period twenty regulations and only two rules were
adopted, and this inclination on the part of some agencies seems
to exist beyond isolated instances." The characterization of agency
action as rule making is best related to the nature of what the
agency is doing rather than what it says it is doing.
Other language in the definition produces similar results. The
definition leaves no basis for contention that rules are confined to
implementation or application of the law. Pronouncements which
"interpret or make specific the law enforced or administered by
[an agency] or... govern its organization or procedure..." are
expressly included.54 Established policy on agency interpretations
supra note 30, at 108.
§ 29A-1-1(c) (1976 Replacement Vol.).
COOPER, supra note 30, at 108 n.61.
W. VA. CODE ANN. § 29A-1-1(c) (1976 Replacement Vol.).

" COOPER,

52 W. VA. CODE ANN.
"
"
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of law, organization and procedure often is of major significance to
one dealing with or affected by agency action, and the definition
reflects this by placing interpretive and procedural matters and
those more substantive in nature on an equal footing. 5
Often determinations of whether specific agency action constitutes rule making and of whether the agency must proceed by rule
making or has a choice56 are uncertain and ambiguous. One area,
however, which is relatively free from limitations of this nature
involves procedural rules. The Act instructs each agency to "adopt
rules or regulations governing the formal and informal procedures
prescribed or authorized by this chapter" and provides that these
rules "shall include rules of practice before the agency, together
with forms and instructions." 57 Procedural rules are mandatory for
each agency.
3.

Nature of Activities Beyond the Definition

In addition to those limitations implicit in the definition of
rule, there are certain matters expressly excluded. As a result the
concept "does not include regulations relating solely to the internal
management of the agency. . . nor mere instructions.""8 There is
little doubt that the imposition of rule-making requirements on
The application of rule making procedures to agency interpretative and policy statements is not without potential adverse effect on public notice and participation. Normally, an agency is under no legal obligation to issue statements of
interpretation or policy. It has been suggested that to require rule-making procedures in these situations will result in fewer interpretative rulings and statements
of policy, thus depriving the public of beneficial clarification of the law. Utton, How
to Stand Still Without Really Trying: A Critiqueof the New Mexico Administrative
ProceduresAct, 10 NAT. REsounCES J. 840, 843-44 (1970). See Bonfield, Some Tentative Thoughts on Public Participationin the Making of InterpretativeRules and
General Statements of Policy Under the A.P.A., 23 AD. L. REy. 101 (1971), for a
discussion generally supporting the federal exclusion of interpretative rules and
statements of policy from normal rule-making procedures. There is some indication
of resistance in the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals to treatment of statements of interpretation and policy on the same basis as substantive rules, despite
the statutory definition of rule. In one case, the court rejected the argument that
an agency which purported to base its decision in a contested case on "long standing
policy" was required to file its policy with the Secretary of State. The court concluded that a policy applied in reaching a decision in a case is not a rule under the
1964 Act, although it declared the policy invalid for other reasons. Haines v. Workmen's Compensation Comm'r, 151 W. Va. 152, 157, 150 S.E.2d 883, 886 (1966).
" See NLRB v. Wyman - Gordon Co., 394 U.S. 759 (1969).
"7 W. VA. CODE ANN. § 29A-3-2 (1976 Replacement Vol.).

'a W. VA. CODE ANN. § 29A-1-1(c) (1976 Replacement Vol.).

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol79/iss4/3

14

Neely: Rights and Responsibilities in Administrative Rule Making in West
ADMINISTRATIVE RULE MAKING
agency action affects the efficiency of agency operations. Although
sacrifices in terms of efficiency may be beneficial to the fairness
and the quality of the agency's actions, the lines drawn here by the
Legislature indicate that there is a point at which efficiency must
prevail. Although matters of internal management or mere instructions may be of great importance to those outside the agency, and
it is not unprecedented to limit the exclusion to situations where
legal rights are not substantially affected,' the West Virginia Act
does not go so far. It does exclude, however, only regulations relating "solely" to internal agency management."0 Any mingling of
matters not otherwise excluded in a regulation concerning agency
management would bring the entire regulation within the general
definition.
The only other express exclusion relates to "regulations of
which notice is customarily given to the public by markers or
signs ..
."" The effect of this provision is to preclude results
which otherwise run contrary to common understanding and expectations. In one case the New York Court of Appeals faced, on
the one hand, a driver convicted of exceeding the posted speed
limit and, on the other, a state agency which had not filed its order
fixing the limit. The controversy centered on whether fixing of the
speed limit constituted creation of a rule. Although the agency
argued that it had issued an order rather than a rule, the court
indicated that: "[t]he term 'rule or regulation', . . embraces any
kind of legislative or quasi-legislative norm or procedure which
establishes a pattern or course of conduct for the future. The label
or name employed is not important and, unquestionably, many socalled 'orders' come within that term."6 Consequently, the rule,
while it had been posted, had not been filed and was therefore
unenforceable. The West Virginia definition eliminates the possibility of this kind of result.
Determining the applicability of rule-making principles and
procedures in light of the pertinent terms and definitions under the
Act is often a difficult task, especially when an assessment of the
subject or nature of government activities is required. The dilemma is in no sense unique to the West Virginia Act. It presents
" See Bonfield, supra note 20, at 833.
" W. VA. CODE ANN. § 29A-1-1(c) (1976 Replacement Vol.).
IId.
62 People v. Cull, 10 N.Y.2d 123, 126, 176 N.E.2d 495, 497, 218 N.Y.S.2d 38,
40 (1961). But see Maestas v. Christmas, 63 N.M. 447, 321 P.2d 631 (1958).
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precisely the kind of problems one would expect when general
terms are intended to reach an extremely wide range of activities.
Whether rule-making principles and procedures apply in an individual case is of fundamental and far-reaching importance. If an
act of government falls within the concept of a rule, the panoply
of rule-making procedures bears on the manner in which the government acts. Otherwise, the government may act relatively free
from mandatory procedural obligation under the Act. This assumes that the procedures for contested cases and other more specific statutes pertaining to individual agencies, if any, do not
apply.
The magnitude of the stakes warrants careful consideration of
whether a particular activity does or does not constitute rule making under the Act. Failure to comply when otherwise required may
result in invalidation of a rule. The need for scrutiny is even greater
when one considers that the latitude afforded for interpretation
carries with it the potential for abuse. Assuming, as seems justified, that many agencies are not likely to revel in the niceties of
rule-making procedure, it is not unreasonable to expect some to
seek ways to bypass the process. One avenue open to the agency is
simply to promulgate rules and ignore prescribed procedures. Theoretically, success along these lines will be shortlived. An agency
might adopt the less blatant approach of interpreting its way
around the procedural requirements. 3 The relevant definitions
provide opportunities of this nature; thus, it is critical that the
authority to make rules be identified and that individual agency
activity be given the scrutiny necessary to determine its source,
subject matter and nature from which procedural requirements
naturally follow.

I.

THE RULE-MAKING PROCESS IN WEST VIRGINIA

The procedural obligations relating to rule making in West
Virginia are not cast upon a single institution or person. The responsibilities are shared, with the principal burdens placed on the
agencies themselves and the Secretary of State. The Legislature
and the courts also have significant roles which are more supervi83 For example, agencies have been known to abuse their power to make emergency rule-making power, thus avoiding normal rule-making procedures. Note,

Rulemaking and Adjudication Under the FloridaAdministrative ProcedureAct, 27

U. FiA. L. REv. 755, 760 (1975); see, e.g., Poschman v. Dumke, 31 Cal. App. 3d 932,
107 Cal. Rptr. 596 (1973).
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sory in nature, although under the 1976 Amendments the Legislature is more intimately involved in rule-making matters. Failure
to meet these assigned responsibilities creates a substantial risk
that the ultimate beneficiary, the public, will be deprived of its
right to meaningful participation in the rule-making process. For
this reason, a thorough understanding of the responsibilities of
each branch of government is essential, if the process is to function
as intended.
A.

The Responsibilities of State Agencies

One source of agency responsibilities in rule-making is statutory law. Considerations of constitutional law, familiar in so many
areas including administrative adjudication, are of considerably
less relevance in rule-making proceedings." Traditional concepts
of procedural due process of law do not require notice and an
opportunity to be heard before promulgation of a rule, in the absence of a statute providing for notice and hearing.15 It is accepted
that "in legislation, or rule-making, there is no constitutional right
to any hearing whatsoever."6 There may be, however, state constitutional provisions which bear on such issues. Publication of
agency rules prior to their effective date was found to be constitutionally required in Wisconsin 7 because of a constitutional provision providing "no general law shall be in force until published."6 Yet, determining that process which is due in rule making does not turn ordinarily on principles of constitutional law but
rather on requirements found in the comprehensive administrative
procedure act and in statutes addressing specific agencies. Generally, statutory procedural requirements pertain to two major areas:
(1) the nature and manner of notice to the public of rule-making
activities, and (2) the extent and nature of the public's right to
participate in the rule-making process.
Another important source of agency responsibilities in rule" E.g., Schwartz, supra note 12, at 161-62, 198-200; Subrin and Dykstra,
Notice and the Right to be Heard: The Significance of Old Friends, 9 HARv. Civ.
RuTs.-Clv. LIB. L. REy. 449, 460 (1974); Note, The JudicialRole in Defining Procedural Requirements for Agency Rulemaking, 87 HARv. L. REv. 782, 785-86 (1974).
11E.g., Bi-Metallic Co. v. Colorado, 239 U.S. 441 (1915); see Keefe,
AdministrativeRule-Making and the Courts,8 FORDHAM L. Rav. 303, 323-24 (1939).
66 Willapoint Oysters v. Ewing, 174 F.2d 676, 694 (9th Cir. 1949), cert. denied,
338 U.S. 860 (1949).
67 Whitman v. Department of Taxation, 240 Wis. 564, 4 N.W.2d 180 (1942).
67

Wis. CONST. art.

7, § 21.
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making is the agency itself. It is easy to overlook the point that the
basic procedural requirements prescribed by statute are minimum
procedures demanded of an agency if its act is to have validity. The
fact that legislatures have not chosen to establish greater requirements does not mean that an agency cannot and should not go
beyond minimum procedural requirements and impose on itself
responsibilities as a matter of policy, especially when one considers
that legislatures must undertake the difficult task of devising general requirements for a broad class of disparate institutions of government. The fact that an oral hearing is not required by either
statutory or constitutional law in a particular case should not lead
the agency inescapably to the conclusion that none is necessary."
It may be that on occasion some form of oral presentation by
interested persons would improve the quality of the agency's rule
and thereby its service to the public.7" In this sense the selfimposed obligation may be more an opportunity than a burden,
although not one to be seized without careful reflection on the
consequences. If an agency elects to adopt a regulation establishing
self-imposed procedural obligations, their voluntary nature allows
no greater freedom to ignore them than that which is permissible
with respect to requirements imposed by statute.7 ' Therefore, there
are often situations in which an agency might develop policy
through rule making, even though there is no clear obligation that
it do so. Professor Kenneth Culp Davis has argued persuasively in
favor of rule making as a mechanism for structuring the exercise
of administrative discretion." Agencies have also been urged to
proceed by rule making rather than case-by-case adjudication
" Under the 1976 Amendments, for example, a notice of proposed rule making
must afford an opportunity for public participation, "orally or in writing," thus
leaving the issue of an oral presentation to the discretion of the agency. W. VA. CoDE
ANN. § 29A-3-8 (1976 Replacement Vol.).
10 Opportunities of this nature exist throughout the administrative process,
limited principally by the imagination and commitment of administrators to public
participation. See generally Gellhorn, Public Participationin Administrative
Proceedings,81 YALE L.J. 359 (1972).
7' E.g., Service v. Dulles, 354 U.S. 363 (1957); Hou Ching Chow v. Attorney
General, 362 F. Supp. 1288 (D. D. C. 1973); cf. Florida Livestock Bd. v. Gladden,
76 So. 2d 291 (Fla. 1954) (An agency was bound by a rule voluntarily delaying the
effective date of a statute). But see Berger, Do Regulations Really Bind
Regulators?, 62 Nw. U.L. Rav. 137 (1967); Note, Violations by Agencies of Their
Own Regulations, 87 HARV. L. Rav. 629, 629-30 (1974).
72 K. DAVIs, DiScRTONARY JUSTICE (1969).
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when they have a choice, as a means of encouraging public participation in agency policy making. 3
It is the statutory source of procedural requirements which is
of greatest consequence. Lapses in the application and enforcement of statutory requirements involve deficiencies in what must
be, whereas self-imposed obligations relate to what should be. The
subsequent discussion deals with the statutory requirements under
the West Virginia Administrative Procedure Act, before and after
its amendment in 1976.
1.

Notice of Proposed Rule Making

Recognition of the value of public participation in the rulemaking process is itself insufficient. There must be effective means
for notification to the public of what an agency proposes to do. To
accomplish this, a variety of techniques has been employed, ranging from formal publication in government publications, such as,
the Federal Register, to personal notice, to publication in newspapers of general circulation. All seek an accommodation between
effective notice and practicability, with varying degrees of success. 4
Prior to the 1976 Amendments, the 1964 Act addressed public
participation in the rule-making process through a combination of
limited personal notice and voluntary agency publication. Under
this arrangement the validity of agency rule making depended in
part upon providing personal notice by mail to persons requesting
it. The class entitled to notice was limited to those who filed a
written request with the agency, and the agency was entitled to
charge a nominal fee of not more than one dollar for providing this
'3 See generally Cramton, The Why, Where and How of Broadened Public
Participationin the AdministrativeProcess, 60 GEo. L.J. 525, 535-36 (1972); Fuchs,
Agency Development of Policy Through Rule-Making, 59 Nw. U.L. REv. 781 (1964);
Robinson, The Making of Administrative Policy:Another Look at Rule-making and
Adjudication and AdministrativeProcedureReform, 118 U. PA. L. REv. 485 (1970);
Shapiro, The Choice of Rule-making orAdjudication in the Development of Administrative Policy, 78 HARv.L. REv. 921 (1965). See also Hanes, Citizen Participation
and its Impact Upon Prompt and Responsible Administrative Action, 24 Sw. L. J.
731 (1970).
" The degree of flexibility permissible in designing notice of rule making is
absent in contested cases. See State ex rel. Hawks v. Lazaro, 202 S.E.2d 109, 124
(W. Va. 1974). This case concerned a commitment to a state hospital where the
court stated "[n]otice contemplates meaningful notice which affords an opportunity to prepare a defense and to be heard upon the merits."
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notice of proposed rule making. A request applied only to proposals
made during the calendar year in which the request was made.7 5 If
the agency elected to publish notice, it could do so in the form of
a legal advertisement in qualified newspapers having general circulation.7"
There was nothing perfunctory in the form prescribed for the
required notice under the 1964 Act. Although it was not mandatory
that the express terms of the proposed rule be included in the
notice, an "informative summary" was required in the alternative.
The notice had to indicate "the time, date and place at which
interested persons may submit data, objections, suggested amendments, views, evidence and arguments orally or in writing concerning the proposed rule . . . ."" It also was required that notice be
timely, in recognition of the likelihood that notice too soon or too
late would be less conducive to meaningful participation; thus,
notice was to be given not less than thirty nor more than sixty days
before the date indicated in the notice.78
Under the 1964 Act, the requirements dealing with dissemination of notice were severely limited in scope, whereas the law was
substantially thorough and complete in its emphasis on informative and timely notice. This contrast need not be attributed to
legislative oversight or lack of vision. The more temperate view
would appear to be that these particular requirements are a product of the process of weighing the public's interest in receiving
notice against the public's interest in the efficiency and economy
of government. In any event, this limited responsibility placed on
agencies to disseminate notice only to those requesting it was
costly in its own fashion. Empirical study of agency practice and
experience would be appropriate and desirable to measure these
costs, but the terms of the statute alone justify and support some
general observations and conclusions.
The requirement of an affirmative request for notice assumed
that members of the public would know which state agencies might
propose rules on which they might desire to comment. Considering
the breadth of the definition of "agency" under the 1964 Act, the
assumption was not entirely reasonable. A person interested in
'1 Acts of the 56th W. Va. Leg. ch. 1, § 29A-3-2, Reg. Sess. [19641 (amended
and reenacted 1976).

76Id.
v Id.
"' Id.
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government rule making affecting agriculture, for example, might
have been expected to file a request for notice with the Department
of Agriculture, but was it reasonable to expect that person, unfamiliar with the intricacies of the law, also to submit a similar
request to the Department of Natural Resources, the Tax Commissioner and others who on occasion may engage in rule making
affecting agricultural matters? There could be no reasonable expectation of participation in the process by large segments of the
public unaware of what to do and how to do it. Nor can it be
assumed that even the initiated were afforded a reasonable opportunity to participate. A member of the Bar whose practice was to
some degree specialized could have been expected to submit an
appropriate request to the appropriate agencies, yet the general
practitioner, whose practice encompassed a wide range of client
interests, confronted the spectre of submitting a request to myriad
state agencies. Whether this was done on any significant scale is
not known, but if it were, the burden was considerable and continuing, since a request did not extend beyond the calendar year
in which it was made.
The 1976 Amendments have shifted the balance dramatically,
and promise to introduce an element of reality to the idea of public
participation in agency rule making. Under the new law, an agency
must file its proposed rule in the newly created state register." The
responsibilities placed on the Secretary of State to publish the
state register and weekly supplements thereto" ° should provide a
more realistic opportunity for public access to the basic information necessary to an informed exercise of rights to participate in
the rule-making process. These developments do not ensure that
we have or ever will have reached the millennium.8 ' Admittedly, a
cursory examination of any issue of the Federal Register suggests
that its principal utility is to the initiated and not to the public at
large. This is so despite honest efforts to meet criticism of this
nature."2 It is to be expected that once a generally satisfactory
"'
'"

W. VA. CODE ANN.
W. VA. CODE ANN.

§ 29A-3-7 (1976 Replacement Vol.).
§ 29A-3-4 (1976 Replacement Vol.).

" See generally Ashman, Representationfor the Poor in State Rulemaking, 24
VAND. L. REv. 1 (1970); Newman, Government and Ignorance - A ProgressReport

on Publication of Federal Regulations, 63 HARv. L. REv. 929 (1950); Futor,
Searching the FederalRegulations: Forty-Seven Steps Are Too Many, 45 A.B.A.J.
43 (1959). See also Federal Crop. Ins. Corp. v. Merrill, 332 U.S. 380, 387 (1947)

(Jackson, J., dissenting).
u2In 1973, new features were added to the Federal Register to make the publi-
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means of distributing notice has been established, attention will
tend to shift to appraisal of the usefulness of the information provided.
2. Public Participation
It is public notice which creates the opportunity for the exercise of the fundamental right of public participation in the rulemaking process. This right provides an opportunity for public influence on the development and course of agency policy making by
administrative rules. Failure to exercise this right does not foreclose subsequent public influence on agency rules; there are also
rights to petition for amendment or repeal of final rules83 as well
as possibilities to enlist the aid of the legislature." Participation
when the rule is only in proposed form, however, has definite advantages. At this stage the agency has not necessarily made a
formal and irrevocable commitment. Thus, emphasis for the public participant is on what the agency should do and why. Once a
rule becomes final, the emphasis shifts to what the agency should
have done. In the latter case the public participant's task is more
difficult.
The 1964 Act provided various opportunities for public participation, including submission of "data, objections, suggested
amendments, views, evidence and arguments orally or in writing
... ,, This alone did not impose on an agency a duty to afford

a formal hearing nor any form of oral presentation. Whether to
provide such was a matter committed to agency discretion, absent
some other statutory requirement. These basic rights of public
participation are comparable to those provided at the federal level
in what is commonly referred to as informal or notice-andcation more usable, including weekly reminders on deadlines for commenting on

proposals and a daily listing of rules going into effect. 38 Fed. Reg. 1569 (1973).
" The 1964 Act expressly provided that interested persons were entitled to
petition an agency for the promulgation, amendment or repeal of any rule. Acts of
the 56th W. Va. Leg. ch. 1, § 29A-3-6, Reg. Sess. [1964] (amended and reenacted
1976). The 1976 Amendments amended and reenacted Article 3 in its entirety.
Probably through oversight, § 29A-3-6 was not reenacted. As a matter of sound
policy, agencies still should accept and consider such petitions. In the event a need
to amend the Act again arises, the Legislature should correct the apparent oversight.
u The legislative review process provides an opportunity of this nature. W. VA.
COD ANN. §§ 29A-3-11, -12 (1976 Replacement Vol.).

1 Acts of the 56th W. Va. Leg. ch. 1, § 29A-3-3, Reg. Sess. [1964] (amended
and reenacted 1976).
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comment rule making. 6 The primary impact of the 1964 Act was
to make possible submission to the agency of whatever an interested person considered germane to the rule-making proceeding as
a matter of right rather than special dispensation.
The 1976 Amendments retained these basic rights of public
participation,"7 and created new ones. Sometimes the Legislature
delegates only conditional rule-making authority to an agency, the
exercise of which is dependent upon the existence of certain circumstances or conditions. The determination of their existence is
left to the agency, but the agency may issue rules only when it
finds or determines that the circumstances or conditions exist. The
Commissioner of Agriculture, for example, is empowered to promulgate regulations requiring a statement of the minimum percentage of calcium and magnesium compounds in the labeling of agricultural liming materials, but only if he "should find. . . that a
requirement for listing the percentage of calcium and magnesium
in elemental form would help in reducing among the states conflicting labeling requirements and would not impose an economic
hardship on purchasers of liming materials. . . ."8 In such cases
the law now requires that a notice of hearing be filed in the state
register. 9 The purpose of the hearing is "for the taking of evidence
upon the issues to be found," and the notice must state the time
and place of the hearing and provide a general description of the
issues to be decided. Provision also is made for discretionary publication of notice in the form of a legal advertisement 0
The procedural significance of this new provision is unclear.
As an abstract proposition it appears that an additional procedural
step is required where agency findings and determinations are a
condition precedent to agency action. An agency first would be
required to file its notice for publication in the state register and
thereafter conduct the prescribed hearing on the findings and determinations to be made. Once it had made the findings and determinations fulfilling the condition precedent, an agency then would
file its findings and determinations in the state register," and only
then could it file its notice of proposed rule making in accordance
N 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1970); see ScHwARTz, supra note 12, at 165-69; e.g., Mobil
Oil Corp. v. Federal Power Comm. 483 F.2d 1238, 1249 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
" W. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 29A-3-8, -9 (1976 Replacement Vol.).
M W. VA. CODE ANN. § 19-15A-3(e) (1977 Replacement Vol.).
' W. VA. CODE ANN. § 29A-3-5 (1976 Replacement Vol.).
'7

Id.

"

W. VA. CODE ANN. § 29A-3-6 (1976 Replacement Vol.).
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with the general requirements under the 1976 Amendments. Separate treatment and consideration of the conditions for rule making
and the substance of the proposed rule would guarantee that each
received undivided attention. Perhaps there would be greater likelihood that a required finding that certain conditions exist would
be a product of conscious deliberation rather than unscrutinized
assumption.
This view would be more persuasive if there were material
differences between public participation with respect to a notice
of hearing as compared to a notice of a proposed rule making. The
fact is that there are not because under the 1976 Amendments an
agency is entitled to limit presentations at a hearing on a condition
precedent to written submissions. 2 It may allow oral presentations, but there is no requirement that it do so. The statute provides that if only written statements are to be received, the "date
of the hearing" is considered to be the last day on which statements may be filed with the agency. 3 Any hearing in the more
traditional sense is entirely optional, just as in the case of proposed
rules. Based on these uncertainties and the absence of other means
of determining the intent of the legislature, it would not seem
unreasonable for an agency to combine both notices in a single
document for filing in the state register. The statute requires clarification if something else is intended."
There is no assurance that the exercise of public rights of
participation will have any impact on the course of agency rule
making. Agencies are not limited to consideration of that which is
received in response to their proposal. In notice-and-comment rule
making, unlike adjudication, the concept of a decision based on
the record before the agency does not apply. The agency is entitled
to take into account and give substantial weight to matters far
beyond what may be raised in public comments." This does not
mean that an agency may arbitrarily or capriciously disregard
"2 W. VA. CODE ANN.

§ 29-3-5 (1976 Replacement Vol.).

93Id.
"1 In that event, § 29A-3-5 should also be amended to provide for the timeliness
of a notice of hearing. That issue is not dealt with in the statute at present, although
the prudent practice for an agency would be to apply the not-less-than-thirty-normore-than-sixty-day rule applicable to proposals, W. VA. CODE ANN. § 29A-3-8
(1976 Replacement Vol.). Of course, a combined notice setting the same date for
both purposes would accomplish this automatically.
"1 See generally SCHWARTZ, supra note 12, at 167-69.
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public response to a proposed rule." Nor should it suggest that
public participation is a mere exercise in futility. That the public
may participate is likely to have salutary effects on the agency as
it shapes its proposal. One would hope and expect that public
comment would precipitate some modification in the content of
final agency rules. Proof of this hypothesis lies in examination of
the practices of specific agencies, but experience suggests it to be
true.
3.

Notice of Final Rules

Both the notice and public hearing provisions for proposed
rules are designed to facilitate public participation in the formulation of policy by rule making. Notice requirements for final rules
have a quite different purpose and are intended to bring about
public compliance with those policies, once formulated and prescribed. These requirements attempt to alleviate the basic unfairness of imposing sanctions for violation of a law which is unknown
and not reasonably available. Dean Griswold suggested in 1934, in
discussing the need for a federal publication for agency rules, that
"[u]ntil some such measure is adopted, it may well be said that
our government is not wholly free from Bentham's censure of the
tyrant who punishes men 'for disobedience to laws or orders which
he had kept from them knowledge of.'-"7 Bentham's point is
equally relevant at the state level, and the objective is to be sought
not as a consequence of legal duty or requirement which compels
notice. All manner of legislative requirements and sanctions are
imposed without knowledge or notice to those who are affected.
Rather, notice requirements for final rules recognize that principles of fundamental fairness may demand that legislatures provide
that which the law does not otherwise provide.
The West Virginia Administrative Procedure Act has relied on
a system involving filing and publication to provide notice of final
rules, with the basic responsibilities divided between the agencies
and the Secretary of State. The principal obligation of the agencies
has been the filing of final rules with the Secretary of State. For
" Under the Act there is provision for declaratory judgment proceedings to
determine the validity of administrative rules. One ground for declaring a rule
invalid is a finding that it is arbitrary or capricious. W. VA. CODE ANN. § 29A-42(b) (1976 Replacement Vol.).
11Griswold, Government in Ignornanceof the Law - A Pleafor Better Publication of Executive Legislation, 48 HARv. L. REv. 198, 213 (1934).
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purposes of the initial transition to implement the 1964 Act, agencies were required to compile and index all lawfully adopted rules
in force on July 1, 1964, the effective date of the Act. A deadline
of January 1, 1965, was established for filing by each agency of two
certified copies of the compilation and index with the Secretary of
State." In the case of rules adopted after the July 1, 1964, effective
date, the Act required agencies to file two certified copies with the
Secretary of State."
Under the 1976 Amendments agency responsibilities in
connection with notice of final rules have been enlarged, but the
emphasis on filing obligations has been retained. The Act now
provides that following publication of notice of proposed rule making and opportunity for public participation, "the agency shall
either finally adopt the rule or regulation as proposed, amend and
finally adopt the proposed rule and regulation, as amended, or
withdraw the proposed rule or regulation."'' ° Previously the Act
was silent on what was expected of an agency if, after proposing a
rule, it elected to abandon the effort. It is now clear that the agency
must "file in the state register a notice of its action."'"' This includes a withdrawal of a proposal. This requirement has considerable merit, since a proposed rule often is used by persons as a guide
to what may be expected and required of them in the future. Some
persons may even consider modifying current practices in anticipation of a final rule, and many could be expected to make plans for
necessary adjustments in the future. Abandonment of the proposal
is information of potential importance to such persons and worthy
of formal publication.
The notice of agency action on its proposal, when it results in
a final rule, must include the text of the rule as finally adopted.' 2
This is especially important when one considers the possibility of
change in a proposal following public participation and legislative
review of the proposal. It is conceivable that a final rule might
depart from the proposal to an extent that they are more dissimilar
than similar. The 1976 Amendments provide for this and require
that "no amendment may change the main purpose of the proW. VA. CODE ANN. § 29A-2-1(a) (1976 Replacement Vol.).
" Acts of the 56th W. Va. Leg. ch. 1, § 29 A-3-4, Reg. Sess. [1964] (amended
and reenacted 1976).
,00
W. VA. CODE ANN. § 29A-3-10 (1976 Replacement Vol.).
101Id.
"

Id.

102
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posed rule or regulation."'' 3 A change in the rule's main purpose
would necessitate treatment of the amended rule as a new proposal
requiring a new notice of proposed rule making and opportunity for
public comment and legislative review.
Agencies also are required to file their findings and determinations in those cases where these are a condition precedent to rule
making. They must "state fully and succinctly the reasons therefor."' 14 The statement of reasons and a transcript of all evidence
received in response to the agency's notice must be preserved for
at least five years after the hearing date set in the notice and be
available for public inspection and copying.' The statute is ambiguous concerning whether the filed findings and determinations
should also include the statement of reasons. Literal interpretation
of the statute indicates that it need not be, but it would be sound
and sensible policy for agencies to do so.
4. Extraordinary Circumstances and Emergency Rule Making
Many of the matters entrusted to administrative agencies over
which they have rule-making authority involve fundamental interests of public protection. Under extraordinary circumstances time
may not allow compliance with normal rule-making procedures
without jeopardizing those interests. This was taken into account
in the 1964 Act and in the 1976 Amendments in special provisions
for rule making in emergency situations.
Under the 1964 Act agencies were empowered to adopt rules
with immediate effect, notwithstanding the requirements for notice and public participation with respect to proposed rules. This
was permitted in emergency situations where immediate effectiveness was "necessary for the immediate preservation of the public
peace, health, safety or welfare" and was accomplished by filing
the rule along with the agency's finding of an emergency and a
brief statement of its reasons for its conclusion."' 0 After the fact the
agency was obligated to give notice of the emergency rule to the
same persons and in the same manner prescribed for notice of
proposed rule making."7 Any temptation to use emergency proce103

Id.

104

W. VA. CODE ANN. § 29A-3-6 (1976 Replacement Vol.).

103
Id.

11Acts of the 56th W. Va. Leg. ch. 1, § 29A-3-5, Reg. Sess. [1964] (amended
and reenacted 1976).
107

Id.
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dures in substitution for normal procedures was anticipated and
dealt with by confining the effective period of an emergency rule
to ninety days. In order for an emergency rule to be effective beyond ninety days, an agency was required to comply with the normal procedures for public notice and participation in proposed rule
making."' 8
The 1976 Amendments retain the basic concept of emergency
rule making and allow agencies to make temporary rules having
immediate effect. Unfortunately, the law no longer contains any
indication of what constitutes an emergency situation, whereas the
1964 Act did give some guidance on the issue. Any increased probability of abuse of the abbreviated procedures for temporary rules
as a result of the breadth of the concept is diminished by retention
of the requirement that temporary rules are effective for only
ninety days." 9 Only if the agency fulfills the normal rule-making
requirements may the temporary rule remain in effect any longer,
and normal requirements for a proposed rule include legislative
review as well as public notice and participation." ' Legislative
review raises the question of the feasibility of promulgating such a
rule within the ninety day limit on its effectiveness, since the time
allowed for legislative review is significantly greater. The statute
does not allow for multiple ninety day periods, 1 ' but an agency can
try to obtain expedited review of its rule.
B. Responsibilities of the Secretary of State
Theoretically there is no reason why the entire burden of providing public notice of proposed and final rules could not rest with
the agencies themselves. This was the case in West Virginia for
notice of proposed rule making prior to the 1976 Amendments.
Nonetheless, the practical consequences of relying on the agencies
for notice of final rules to both the agencies and the public can be
significant. Time devoted by agencies to the mechanics of procedural compliance, such as mailing and printing, might be spent
more productively on substantive matters. For the public, the
103Id.
,oW. VA. CODE ANN. § 29A-3-14 (1976 Replacement Vol.).

,' Some jurisdictions have rejected the emergency requirement and allowed
avoidance of normal procedures where "the monetary or other loss attendant to
public rule-making procedures far outweighs any possible societal benefits." Bon-

field, supra note 20, at 861.
I" W. VA. CODE ANN. § 29A-3-14 (1976 Replacement Vol.).
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time, inconvenience and uncertainty of dealing with agencies on
an individual basis to obtain notice of proposed and final rules can
reduce drastically the utility and availability of notice. To require
that one go to each particular agency for its proposed and final
rules may result in duplication of effort and drain the resources
and energies of the public as well as the agencies.11
There are no doubt a few who would suggest there is merit in
a system which demands a bit of inconvenience, a bit of pain, to
receive its benefits. In this way, the process will function unimpeded by those who are simply curious; demands will be made
only by those who want to know with sufficient urgency and intensity to put themselves to the trouble. There is no reason to believe
that thoughts of this nature are at the heart of systems of rulemaking procedure which place principal burdens for providing notice on the agencies. The 1964 Act on its face reveals a commitment
to the virtues of public notice and participation even though it
places considerable burdens on the public. The statute appears not
to have gone as far as it might have out of concern for government
efficiency. This was, for example, the apparent justification in
Massachusetts when it placed the responsibility for publication of
final rules on the agencies under its original comprehensive administrative procedure act in 1954. Massachusetts rejected central
compiliation, publication and distribution along the lines of the
federal system, "reflecting the view that a less elaborate and less
expensive approach should be tried first." ' Experience did not
justify reliance on the agencies. Non-compliance was common,",
and today Massachusetts requires centralized publication for ad5
ministrative rules."
The burdens and obstacles which are created by fragmented
distribution of the obligations of public notice among the agencies
can be reduced considerably by designation of a single person or
institution as the repository or conduit for matters requiring public
notice. Increasingly, comprehensive state administrative procedure acts have included provisions of this kind."' In West Virginia
M See Moreland, State Administrative Rules and Regulations, 21

MICH. ST.

B.J. 22 (1942).
M Curran and Sacks, The MassachusettsAdministrative ProcedureAct, 37
Bos. U.L. Rav. 70, 83-84 (1957).
" O'Leary, The Right to Be Informed, 54 MASS. L.Q., 63, 69-71 (1969).
", MASs. GEN. LAws ANN.ch. 30A, § 6 (1973).
"i ALAsKA STAT. §§ 44.62.130, .140, .160 (1962); CAL. STATE GOV'T. CODE ANN.
§ 11409 (Supp. 1977); COLO. Rav. STAT. § 24-4-103 (11) (1973); CONN. GEN. STAT.
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the Office of the Secretary of State has been assigned this pivotal
role in the rule-making process.
1.

The Secretary of Statetas Repository

The 1964 Act required agencies to file final rules with the
Secretary of State, a requirement which extended to all rules in
effect on July 1, 1964, the Act's effective date, as well as to any
adopted thereafter. To facilitate performance of this major task,
the Secretary of State was charged with the responsibility for promulgating his own rules, prescribing a standard size, format and
numbering system for agency rules, and for refusing to accept any
which failed to comply."1 7 This compilation of agency rules, once
established and subsequently expanded upon the filing of new
rules, was intended to provide a permanent register for all rules
required to be filed with the Secretary of State. Its creation and
maintenance was his responsibility, and the Act required further
that the permanent register be made available for public inspection during office hours of the Secretary."'
The permanent register has obvious merit. In a single location
one can determine the existence and nature of agency rules required to be filed, secure in the knowledge that this is where they
must be. This was not, however, the only possible source of inforANN. § 4-173 (Supp. 1977); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 120.55 (Supp. 1977); GA. CODE ANN.
§ 3A-107 (1975); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 4-22-2-7 to -9 (1974); IOWA CODE ANN. § 17A.6
(Supp. 1977); KAN. STAT. §§ 77-427, -430 (Supp. 1976); KY. REV. STAT. § 13.096
(Supp. 1976); LA. REV. STAT. § 49:954.1 (Supp. 1977); ME. REV. STAT. tit. 5, § 2353
(1964); MD. ANN. CODE art. 41, § 256C (Supp. 1976); MAss. ANN. LAws ch. 30A, § 6
(1973); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 3.560 (146) (Supp. 1977); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 15.051
(1977); Miss. CODE ANN. § 25-43-11 (Supp. 1977); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 536.031 (Supp.
1977); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 82-4206 (Supp. 1975); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 541-

A:5 (Supp. 1973); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52: 1413-7 (Supp. 1976); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 432-6 (1974); N.Y. ExEc. LAWS § 160 (McKinney Supp. 1975); N.C. GEN. STAT. §
150A-63 (Supp. 1975); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 75, §§ 255, 256 (1976); On, REV. STAT.
§ 183.360 (1975); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 45, §§ 701-702 (Special Pamphlet 1977); R.I.
GEN. LAWS § 42-35-5 (1969); S.C. CODE §§ 1-16, -17 (1962); S.D. CoMPLED LAWS
ANN. § 1-26A-1 (Supp. 1977); TENN. CODE ANN. § 4-502 (Supp. 1976); Tax. REv.
CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-13a, § 6 (Supp. 1976); UTAH CODE ANN. § 63.46-7 (Supp.
1977); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 3, §§ 804, 805 (Supp. 1977); VA. CODE § 9.6.19 (Supp.
1976); WAsH. RE. CODE § 34.04.050 (1967); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 35.93 (West Supp.
1977); Wyo. STAT. § 9-276.23 (Supp. 1975). The laws of the District of Columbia
and Puerto Rico have similar provisions. D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 1-1504, 1507, 1602
(Supp. Il 1976); P.R. LAws ANN. tit. 3, § 1054 (1965).
W. VA. CODE ANN. § 29A-2-1(b) (1976 Replacement Vol.).
"' Id. § 29A-2-1(a).

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol79/iss4/3

30

Neely: Rights and Responsibilities in Administrative Rule Making in West
ADMINISTRATIVE RULE MAKING
mation on final rules. Although not required under the Act, many
agencies made available copies of their rules and regulations. The
practice was a sound and useful one, but a pamphlet of agency
rules dated five or ten years ago should be regarded with suspicion.' Reliance on such a pamphlet would be foolhardy because
agencies were not required to make the final rules available, much
less current. The permanent register makes possible a determination of precisely what the agency rules are at any particular moment.
The disadvantage in the permanent register is its presumption
of ready and equal access. What is relatively convenient for one in
Charleston may be totally inaccessible as a practical matter to one
in other areas of the state.
Under the 1976 Amendments the concept of a permanent register is retained and its content enlarged. The Secretary of State
is required to establish and maintain a state register, the purpose
of which is to provide "a compilation of the rules and regulations
of the various agencies, and. . . notice of proposed rules or regula."I"2 Thus,
tions or the taking of evidence with respect thereto ...
the state register must contain not only final rules as previously
required of the permanent register, but also proposed rules, notices
and statements of findings and determinations condition precedent to rule making and related matters arising out of the legislative
review process. The "form and fashion" of the new register are
within the discretion of the Secretary of State; its existence and
2
maintenance are not.' '
Since the Secretary of State is obligated by law to duplicate
the state register and furnish it and weekly supplements on a subscription basis,' 2 the role of the Secretary today is less that of a
repository and more that of a clearing and publishing house for
public notice at key stages in the rule-making process. The permanent register in the Secretary of State's office nevertheless may be
H' For example, the Public Service Commission of West Virginia has published
and made available a pamphlet on its "Rules of Practice and Procedure - Rules and
Regulations for the Government of the Construction and Filing of Tariffs of Public
Utilities and Common Carriers." The pamphlet is dated January 2, 1969. The
Public Service Commission of West Virginia published subsequent rules on an
individual basis. On March 1, 1977, the Commission published new pamphlets
containing new and revised rules on the above and other subjects.
' W. VA. CODE ANN. § 29A-3-4 (1976 Replacement Vol.).
121 Id.
122 Id.
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of importance in limited situations. For example, assume that an
administrative agency is about to publish a notice of proposed rule
making. One of those who expects to be affected by the rule, if
adopted as proposed, is an industrial firm which knows generally
what the agency is likely to propose and that the proposal is not
likely to be favorable to its interests. Here, early knowledge of the
precise terms of the proposal may put the firm in a better position
to respond to inquiries from the media and investors, and, for a
variety of reasons, the agency may be unable or unwilling to give
the firm advance notice of its proposal. Here, the firm has a choice
between waiting for publication of the weekly supplement to the
state register or, if it desires, checking for filings in the state register on a daily basis at the Secretary of State's Office. Similar needs
could arise in connection with a final rule or any other item required to be filed in the state register. The permanent register
provides a means for obtaining the earliest possible official notice
of rule-making activities.'
2.

The Secretary of State as Publisher

Realistic and meaningful public notice, participation and
compliance with regard to administrative rules are assured primarily through the publishing responsibilities of the Secretary of
State. In comparison, his role as repository is incidental. The importance of effective distribution and dissemination of rulemaking information was recognized in the 1964 Act, at least with
respect to final rules. To that end the Legislature assigned specific
duties to the Secretary of State.
The Secretary of State was instructed to publish, "as soon as
practicable" after January 1, 1965, "as to each agency, in pamphlet form, all rules adopted by such agency and on file in his
office." 1' This represents a natural and logical extension of the
agencies' obligation to compile and index all rules and regulations
in force on July 1, 1964, and file them with the Secretary of State
by January 1, 1965. Once the agencies had met their responsibility,
the burden shifted to the Secretary to publish all filed rules and
regulations. The language of the statute suggests that the Legisla'2 This is not merely a hypothetical use. The author on numerous occasions
in the course of representing commercial interests consulted the Office of the Federal Register to determine the content of regulations "on display" and not yet
published.

124Acts of the 56th W. Va. Leg. ch. 1, § 29A-3-7 (a), Reg. Sess. [1964]
(amended and reenacted 1976).
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ture envisioned a series of pamphlets, one for each agency, to be
"supplemented or revised as often as necessary."12
The Secretary of State also was instructed "to publish a quarterly bulletin in which he shall set forth the text of all rules filed
during the preceeding quarter . .." with the exception of rules in
effect on January 1, 1965.126 This was natural and logical because
it assured general availability of a relatively current compilation
of final agency rules. Both the initial publications and quarterly
bulletins were required to be made available to the public for a
charge representing publishing and mailing costs. 12
From the standpoint of the public these publications offered
to guarantee that their contents would accurately depict the status
of an agency's rules at any time after their date of publication.
There would have been an element of risk in assuming that the
rules presented in the Secretary of State's publications were current because bulletins were to be published only quarterly, but new
rules could be expected to be filed daily with the Secretary of
State. From this, it does not follow that the publications were
nothing more than a convenient service, gratuitously made available to the public. These publications were integral to the Legislature's overall design for public notice of agency rules.
Publication, as required of the Secretary of State, under the
1964 Act, would have the effect of reducing the need for reliance
on inspection of the permanent register in order to ascertain an
agency's current rules. A member of the public first would examine
the appropriate published pamphlets and quarterly bulletins. This
task would not be restricted to one office in one city. The permanent register in the Secretary of State's Office would need to be
consulted only to update the most recent quarterly bulletin. The
need to update the bulletin through examination of the permanent
register would be less for persons having sufficient interest in the
activities of a particular agency to request personal notice of proposed rule making than for persons not requesting such notice.
Aware of the current rule-making activities of the agency, these
persons would be in a position to assess the likelihood of a final rule
affecting them having been filed since publication of the last
quarterly bulletin.
Id.
Id. § 29A-3-7(b).
I2Id. § 29A-3-7(d).
12

126
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In anticipation of a question which is perhaps implicit in this
discussion and which is answered in detail elsewhere in this article,2 8 there is little justification for the argument that the intricacies of notice as maintained and published by the Secretary of
State are of less concern because the same information is available
from the agencies themselves. For the moment it is sufficient to say
that it is to the Secretary of State and not to the agencies that the
Legislature directed the public for information on final rules.
The Legislature was not unmindful of the magnitude of the
task given the Secretary of State. While the agencies were required
to file their compilations and indices by January 1, 1965, or have
rules not filed declared invalid,' the Legislature was more solicitous toward the Secretary of State and instructed that the pamphlets be published only "as soon as practicable"'2 ° after that date.
There is room for wonder, however, whether the passage of over
eleven years without publication of anything whatsoever by the
Office of the Secretary of State under the 1964 Act bears any
reasonable relationship to practicability, one way or the other.
The 1976 Amendments prescribed the manner and time in
which the Secretary of State was to implement the new state register. The legislative mandate required the Secretary to arrange all
rules on file in a volume or record within ninety days of June 7,
1976, the effective date of the Amendments, and to add to this
state register on a continuing basis the various matters required by
law to be filed in it. ' All of the materials essential to this effort
were on file with and under the control of the Secretary; therefore,
the Legislature elected not to impose any affirmative obligations
on the agencies in connection with preparation of the state register.
The state register, once prepared, and the weekly supplements
thereto were to be made available on a subscription basis to anyone
applying, at a cost fixed by the Secretary and reflecting the expenses of preparation and distribution.' The amendments also gave
See generally text accompanying notes 228-59 infra.
W. VA. CODE ANN. § 29A-2-1(a) (1976 Replacement Vol.).
'3' Acts of the 56th W. Va. Leg. ch. 1, § 29A-3-7(a) [1964] (amended and reenacted 1976).
'
W. VA. CODE ANN. § 29A-3-4 (1976 Replacement Vol.).
132 W. VA. CODE ANN. § 29A-3-4 (1976 Replacement Vol.). A subscription price
determined on this basis may be prohibitively expensive. Pennsylvania concluded
that some subsidy was essential and makes its Bulletin available for nine dollars
per year and its administrative Code for twenty-nine dollars. In 1972, the Bulletin
had a paid circulation of 15,000, including 8,500 nongovernment subscriptions.
'

'
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the Secretary of State the responsibility for publishing permanent
volumes of final agency rules "from time to time but at least biennially."' 3 Thus, the Legislature provided under the 1976 Amendments for a comprehensive system of published documents on developments in agency rule making.
This system with a state register, kept current through weekly
supplements and complemented by reasonably current permanent
volumes containing final rules, has its advantages and disadvantages. First, it has the effect of funneling information on various
stages in the rule-making process through a single institution, the
Office of the Secretary of State. A single, centralized source of this
information reduces the burdens on the public significantly and
reduces the extent to which agencies must devote time and effort
to notifying the public. Second, the Secretary of State is required
to serve as a conduit as well as a reposity for this information. His
affirmative duty to publish this information and make it accessible
increases its availability to all in West Virginia. From this it seems
reasonable to expect the state register to improve the quantity and
quality of public notice, participation and compliance with respect
to agency rule making. The disadvantage and risk in the new state
register system lies in its vulnerability to total breakdown. If an
individual agency fails to meet its responsibilities, the consequences, although serious, are limited to that agency and its rulemaking activities. But similar failure at the level of the Office of
the Secretary of State has far-reaching impact. Unfortunately, theoretical risk has become reality. At the time of this writing, months
after the deadline for initial compilation and publication of the
state register, it still is not available although all the materials
essential to this effort were on file with and under the control of
the Secretary within the prescribed time period. 3 '
With respect to the Code, 2,900 had been sold, 1,200 of which were to those outside
government. Zeiter, Pennsylvania General Rules of Practice and Procedure - A
Surprising By-Product of a State Register System, 24 AD. L. Rzv. 275, 283-84
(1972).
"= W. VA. CODE ANN. § 29A-3-4 (1976 Replacement Vol.).
'4 The current Secretary of State, A. James Manchin, who took office in January, 1977, has indicated that his office is working diligently on the matter and
expects to publish the register at the earliest date possible. During the summer of
1977, the Secretary did begin making proposed rules then being filed with him
available on a subscription basis. See Neely, The 1976 Amendments to the West
Virginia AdministrativeProcedureAct, W. VA. B.A. AD. L. SEC. BuLL. (July, 1977).
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Responsibilities of the Legislature

A common concern among legislative bodies is how to maintain control and supervisory power over administrative agencies
and especially over those whose existence and authority stems directly from the legislatures. That the demands of effective and
efficient government may recommend and, perhaps, even compel
creation of administrative bodies and delegation of basic powers of
government to them, need represent neither a corresponding abdication of legislative responsibility nor an end to legislative interest
in an area. What normally develops is a keen awareness within the
legislative body of its duty to attempt to control that which it has
created.
The techniques employed by legislatures to exercise control
and supervision over administrative action are numerous and varied. Legislative powers over appropriations, standing and watchdog committees, investigations, intercession in pending matters
and, in some instances, participation in the appointment of administrative officials are means by which legislatures intervene in
the administrative process. "5 Central to the legislature's ability to
control and supervise administrative action is its fundamental legislative power. Powers which the legislature may confer may be
withdrawn or reshaped by repeal or amendment of statutory law. 38
Implicit in the activities of a legislative standing committee is the
possibility that an agency, unmindful of and unresponsive to the
will of the legislature, may be brought to task by enactment of new
legislation with the express object of reversing the course currently
pursued by the agency.
Before amendment of the West Virginia Administrative Procedure Act in 1976, the West Virginia Legislature had at its disposal these more traditional means of control over administrative
action. The 1976 Amendments establish new procedures for legislative review of agency rules and regulations, the effect of which is
See Boisvert, A Legislative Tool for Supervisionof AdministrativeAgencies:

The Laying System, 25 FoRnHAM L. REv. 638, 666 (1956-57); [hereinafter cited as
Boisvert]; Herwitz and Mulligan, The Legislative Investigating Committee, 33
COLUM. L. Ray. 1 (1933); Melville, Legislative Control Over Administrative Rule
Making, 32 U. CIN. L. Rey. 33, 35-37 (1963) [hereinafter cited as Melville]; Newman and Keaton, Congressand the Faithful Execution of the Laws . Should Legis.

lators Supervise Administrators?, 41 CALiF. L. Rav. 565, 567-70 (1953); Schwartz,
supra note 13, at 521-22.
In See Kinnane, Administrative Law: Some Observations on Separation of
Powers, 38 A.B.A.J. 19, 22 (1952); Melville, supra note 135, at 35-37.
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to bring the Legislature into the rule-making process on a more
formal, direct and continuing basis.
Provision for legislative review of agency rules is not unprece-

dented. For some time British statutes conferring rule-making authority have on occasion required that, before becoming effective,
rules must be laid before Parliament for affirmative approval.
More often British statutes have allowed administrative rules to
become effective, subject to the proviso that they may be annulled
by resolution of either House of Parliament within a certain period
of time.'37 There is no general counterpart to the British system of
laying rules before Congress;'38 however, a minority of states do
provide some form of legislative review of rules. Their number,
which now includes West Virginia, has been increasing, perhaps
revealing some disenchantment with traditional techniques as
effective and adequate means for control of administrative ac39
tion.'
1.

The Legislative Rule-making Review Committee of the West
Virginia Legislature

For the purpose of undertaking legislative review of agency
rules on a continuing basis, the 1976 Amendments provide for a
new "statutory body to be known as the legislative rule-making
review committee."' 40 The task assigned to the Committee is the
"review [of] all rules or regulations of the several agencies follow'" Note, 65 HARv. L. REV. 637, 637-38 (1952); See generally COOPER, supranote
30, at 222-24; Boisvert, supra note 135, at 638-50; Melville, supra note 135, at 3843; Stewart, Constitutionalityof the Legislative Veto, 13 HARv. J. LEG. 593 (1976).
'" See ScHWARTZ, supranote 12 at 181-82. Note, CongressionalVeto OfAdministratieAction: The ProbableResponse to A ConstitutionalChallenge, 1976 DuKE
L.J. 285, 286-87 (1976).
'"' ALASKA STAT. § 44.62.320 (1962); ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 6-610 to -612 (1976);
CONN. GEN. STAT. REV. § 4-170, -171 (West Supp. 1976); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 11.60,
120.54 (Supp. 1976); IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 67-5217, -5218 (Supp. 1976); IOWA CODE
ANN. §§ 17A.4(4), .8 (West Supp. 1977); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 77-426 (Supp. 1976);
Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 13.085, .087 (Supp. 1976); MD. ANN. CODE art. 40, § 40A
(Supp. 1976); MICH. STAT. ANN. §§ 3.560(135), (145) (Supp. 1977); MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 3.965 (West 1977); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 536.037 (Supp. 1976); MONT. REv.
CODEs ANN. § 82.4203.1-.5 (Supp. 1977); NEB. REv. STAT. §§ 84-904, -908 (Cum.
Supp. 1976); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 75, § 308 (1976); OR. RaV. STAT. §§ 171.707-.713
(1975); S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN. § 1-26-1.1 (Supp. 1977); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 3,
§§ 817-819 (Supp. 1977); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 34.04.160 (1965); W. VA. CODE
ANN. §§ 29A-3-11, -12 (1976 Replacement Vol.); Wis. REv. STAT. §§ 13.56, .565
(West Supp. 1977); cf. THE BOOK OF STATES 64-65 (1974-75).
"' W. VA. CODE ANN. § 29A-3-11(a) (1976 Replacement Vol.).
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ing the proposal thereof."'' The effect is to require legislative review of the bulk of proposed rules, the exception being agency
"rules of procedure, practice or evidence for dealings with or proceedings before the agency."" 2 Legislative review is not applicable
to rule-making activities otherwise exempt by virtue of the subject
matter or the initiating institution."'
The Legislative Rule-making Review Committee is bipartisan
and consists of twelve legislators, six from the Senate and the
House of Delegates respectively, but not more than four of the six
may be of the same political party. The President of the Senate
and Speaker of the House, who are ex officio' nonvoting members,
designate the co-chairmen of the Committee and appoint committee members from their respective houses."' The new law provides
for compensation and expenses of committee members as well as
for "those incurred in the employment of legal, technical, investigative, clerical, stenographic, advisory, and other personnel.' 4 5
The latter provision is significant because it indicates an appreciation of the necessity for adequate supporting services in the discharge of the Committee's responsibilities. The provision for
meetings upon call of the co-chairmen "at any time, both during
sessions of the legislature and in the interim" indicates the continuing nature of these responsibilities.'
The 1976 Amendments confer extraordinary powers upon the
Legislative Rule-making Review Committee. Most other states
which rely on special legislative committees in the review process
have given them considerably lesser roles. In several states the
committee's principal function is the review of agency rules for the
purpose of making recommendations to the legislature for further
action," 7 although in some states there is also emphasis on transmitting committee objections to the agency promulgating the
rule."' In these jurisdictions the committees views are without
141Id.

W. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 29A-3-7(a), -11(b) (1976 Replacement Vol.).
See generally text accompanying notes 25-26 supra.
"' W. VA. CODE ANN. § 29A-3-11(a) (1976 Replacement Vol.).
143Id.
146Id.
M,MD. ANN. CODE art. 40, § 40A (Supp. 1976); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 536.037
(Supp. 1976); NEB. REv. STAT. § 84-904 (2) (Cum. Supp. 1976); ORE. Rnv. STAT. §§
171.707, .713 (1975); S.D. CompmED Lws ANN. § 1-26-1.1 (Supp. 1977); WAsH. REV.
CODE ANN. § 34.04.160 (1965).
I" ARK. STAT. ANN. § 6-610 (1976); Ky. REv. STAT. §§ 13.087(4) - (7) (Supp.
1976); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 3, §§ 818, 819 (Supp. 1977).
"'

11
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independent effect, absent further legislative action. The situation
is similar in Florida, but if any agency adopts its rule over the
objection and disapproval of the Florida Administrative Procedures Committee, the fact is recorded as a historical note to the
" ' In Iowa something more
rule in the Florida Administrative Code.14
than a footnote is at stake for the agency which proceeds over the
objection of the Administrative Rules Review Committee; the
agency bears the burden of proof to sustain the validity of its rule
in any proceeding for its judicial review or enforcement.'5 In a few
states committee action on a rule may bring about a temporary
suspension, but even there further legislative action is required for
lasting impact on agency rules.' Submission of a proposed rule to
the Committee in West Virginia is neither for informational purposes alone nor for formulation of recommendations. More is involved than a temporary suspension of the rule. In West Virginia
submission is for the purpose of legislative approval."' With few
exceptions a rule cannot become effective until Committee approval is forthcoming, although failure of the Committee to act
within one hundred eighty days of submission of a proposal to it
is deemed approval of the rule."' Connecticut is the only other
jurisdiction with a legislative review committee having comparable authority. The similarity is not unexpected, since the Connecticut statutory provisions for legislative review provided a model for
the West Virginia Legislature."'
Solely from the point of view of a legislature desiring more
effective control over agency rule making, the role and powers
given the Legislative Rule-making Review Committee seem desirable and advantageous. Yet there is an important distinction between this Committee and most other forms of legislative control
over administrative action. In most instances, legislative controls
are not as direct in nature as here. A watchdog committee, for
example, may conclude after investigation and public hearings
that the direction in which an agency is proceeding is improper,
unwise or both. To remedy this, new legislation may result, but,
in the interim, the agency is entitled to continue on its course.
t41
'

FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 120.54(13), 11.60(2)(e) (Supp. 1976).
IOWA CODE ANN. § 17A.4.4(a) (West 1977).

' ! MICH. STAT. ANN. § 3.560
Wis. STAT. ANN. § 13.56 (1977).
"'

W. VA. CODE ANN.

13

Id.

(145) (1977); MINN.

STAT. ANN.

§ 3.965 (1977);

§ 29A-3-11(b) (1976 Replacement Vol.).

I" CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.

§ 4-170 (West Supp. 1976).
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Should the attention of the watchdog committee be diverted to
another issue, the normal conduct of agency business proceeds
apace, impeded only by the possibility of future legislative action.
West Virginia's type of legislative review would avert such a situation, which is one of its advantages. What must not go unnoticed
is that this is achieved only by introducing legislative review directly into the rule-making process. Legislative review in West
Virginia is not simply another mechanism for control of the rulemaking process; rather it is part of the process itself.
The Legislative Rule-making Review Committee has atypical
and extraordinary responsibilities. Only if these are met in satisfactory fashion can there be any possibility of effective and expeditious functioning of the process. Whether they will be met must
await experience with the Committee, although there is every indication that at present it is fully aware of the significance of its
responsibilities. Some observations are possible and seem justified
at this time. These may be of some usefulness in establishing the
legal and practical boundaries within which the Committee should
act.
The attention which the Committee can be expected to devote
to individual rules will vary, but something more than a cursory
examination is intended. The statute requires the Committee to
study all proposed rules submitted to it.'ss Reasoned and refined
judgments are within the Committee's ability since it is not confined to the absolutes of approval or disapproval but is entitled to
approve in part and/or disapprove in part any rule, and one
hundred eighty days is a great deal of time in which to make such
judgments. To assist in these efforts the Committee has discretionary authority to hold public hearings on proposed rules. ' All of
these factors indicate that more than pro forma ratification of
agency proposals is expected of the Committee. The statute creating the Committee takes into account the burden of meaningful
review in its reference to supporting staff and services.' 7 A realistic
appraisal of the task before it should cause the Committee to exercise the option to obtain support to the extent necessary. Committee review need not be deficient for want of effort; however, the
Legislature was perhaps overly generous in providing for a one
§ 29A-3-11(b) (1976 Replacement Vol.).
Id.
W. VA. CODE ANN. § 29A-3-11(a) (1976 Replacement Vol.).

.. W. VA. CODE ANN.
"
"5

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol79/iss4/3

40

Neely: Rights and Responsibilities in Administrative Rule Making in West
ADMINISTRATIVE RULE MAKING
hundred eighty day limit for Committee action."' Even in Connecticut the Legislative Review Committee is allowed only sixtyfive days in which to act."1 9 The one hundred eighty day limit on
Committee action on a proposed rule could result in unreasonable
delay in the development of agency policy through rules. How
much time is necessary and reasonable will depend on many factors, varying from rule to rule. A sensible approach would be for
the Committee to complete its review as expeditiously as possible
in each instance in a manner consistent with its basic responsibilities. .
Avoidance of undue delay in legislative review will permit the
rule-making process to proceed with minimal interference, thus
disarming to a degree the critic who views legislative review as a
drain on administrative efficiency. ' This path also reduces risks
which might otherwise accompany undue delay. First, there is the
risk that an agency will seek to avoid the process by refusing to
make rules or by making rules and calling them something else.
In either case the results would be unfortunate. Development and
implementation of certain kinds of policy are particularly suitable
for rule making, but no policy at all may be an attractive alternative to some agencies. Undue delay might encourage recourse to
the no policy approach. An agency which goes "underground,"
making rules under the guise of something different, deprives the
public of its rights to notice and participation. Surreptitious rule
making may prove difficult to detect and thus less likely to be
brought to task. Second, an agency distressed by undue delay, may
be tempted to rely on emergency rule making in situations where
true emergency conditions are lacking."' Experience indicates that
the risk is more than theoretical. At one time in Michigan normal
rule-making procedures could be avoided upon certification by the
Governor of existence of an emergency. The customary practice
developed of characterizing almost every rule an "emergency
rule."'' 2 While this course serves only to defer, rather than to eliminate legislative review, it also delays public notice and participation. The advantages of an orderly rule-making process justifies
I'W. VA.

CODE ANN.§

29A-3-11(b) (1976 Replacement Vol.).

'' CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 4-170 (West Supp. 1977).
' Cf. Note, Can The JointAdministrative ProceduresCommittee Adequately

Solve Administrative Conflict, 4 FLA. ST. U. L. Rsv. 350, 361-63 (1976).
N6INote, Rulemaking and Adjudication Under the FloridaAdministrative Procedure Act, 27 U. FIA. L. REv. 755 (1975).
M CooPER, supra note 30, at 201-02.
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reducing the temptation wherever possible, and prompt legislative
review is one way of accomplishing this.
Another Committee responsibility which deserves careful consideration is the scope of legislative review. The nature and extent
of the Committee's inquiry concerning a proposed rule will have
an effect on the speed and efficiency of review; however, no standard concerning the scope of legislative review appears in the statute. The only general conclusion supported by the language itself
is that it is intended that the committee's inquiry be substantial.
Some state legislatures have attempted to structure legislative review activities by indicating matters appropriate to form the basis
for legislative review actions or recommendations. The most frequent expression concerning the scope of legislative review involves
a determination of whether the administrative rule is contrary to
legislative intent.'6 Others include an additional criterion of
64
whether the rule exceeds the authority delegated to the agency,'
and a few expressly include a determination of the arbitrary,'" or
arbitrary or capricious nature of the rule.'
Another relevant consideration in determining the proper
scope of the Committee's inquiry is the role of the judiciary with
respect to agency rules. Since 1964 the Act has provided for declaratory judgment actions to determine the validity of final
agency rules.' Persons are entitled to initiate a declaratory judgment proceeding "when it appears that the rule, or its threatened
application, interferes with or impairs or threatens to interfere
with or impair, the legal rights or privileges of the plaintiff or
plaintiffs."'' 8 In a declaratory judgment proceeding, the statute
provides that the court declare a rule invalid if it finds that the
rule violates constitutional provisions, exceeds the statutory
authority or jurisdiction of the agency, was adopted without compliance with statutory rule-making procedures, is arbitrary or
13 ARK. STAT. ANN. § 6-610 (1976 Replacement Vol.); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 675218 (Supp. 1977); Ky. REV. STAT. § 13.087(4) (Supp. 1976); OR. REV. STAT. §
171.709(3) (1975); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 3, § 818(c) (Supp. 1977); WASH. REV. CODE
ANN. § 34.04.160 (1965).
... IOWA CODE ANN. § 17A.4. a. (Supp. 1977-1978); Ky. REV. STAT. § 13.087(4)
(Supp. 1976); ORE. REv. STAT. § 171.709(3) (1975); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 3, § 818(c)

(Supp. 1977).
288

VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 3, § 818(c) (Supp. 1977).
IOWA CODE ANN. § 17A.4. a (Supp. 1977-1978).

,e Acts of the 56th W. Va. Leg. ch. 1, § 29A-4-2, Reg. Sess. [1964] (codified
at W. VA. CODE ANN. § 29A-4-2 (1976 Replacement Vol.)).
'U W. VA. CODE ANN. § 29A-4-2(a) (1976 Replacement Vol.).
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capricious, or is based on emergency rule-making procedures without justification.'69 It would not be surprising for any of these
issues to arise in the course of legislative review of a proposed rule.
This potential for overlap between the scope of judicial and
legislative review may be of significance to the issue of whether
legislative review violates the doctrine of separation of powers in
that it usurps judicial functions.
There would be substantial merit in development of some general statement of the scope of legislative review to be employed by
the Legislative Rule-making Review Committee. This could be
accomplished by statutory amendment, but there is no reason why
the Committee itself could not issue its own general guidelines
indicating how it intends to define the scope of its review of agency
proposals. It might, for example, announce its intention to review
proposed rules to determine their conformity with general legislative intent. It might extend its review to questions of whether
statutory authority has been exceeded, although to do so would
exacerbate the problem of overlap with judicial functions. Both
techniques are consistent with the general approach adopted in
those states which have focused on the scope of review issue. On
the other hand, the Committee might indicate its intention not to
review proposals on constitutional grounds and leave this traditionally judicial function to the courts. To the extent that the
review process is vulnerable to constitutional challenge, such action on the part of the Committee could serve to reduce the risk of
a finding of unconstitutionality of the legislative review process.
The techinque of Committee pronouncement of its intentions
should be considered with respect to the issue of its procedures.'
As an integral component in the rule-making process, the Committee probably can expect constant and sometimes intense pressure
from both the agencies and the public. General guidelines concerning what the Committee expects of the agencies could simplify the
Committee's task and make the process more orderly. Guidelines
made known to the public concerning the circumstances under
which the Committee will be inclined to exercise its discretion to
hold a public hearing on a rule would also be useful."' Guidelines
'a' Id. § 29A-4-2(b).

110
For example, some years ago the legislative review committee in Michigan
"adopted its own rules for hearings on complaints arising out of agencies." Smith
and Sharkoff, Legislative Review of Administrative Regulation, 29 MICH. ST. B. J.,
No. 8,29, 30 (Aug. 1950).
17

W. VA. CODE ANN. § 29A-3-11(b) (1976 Replacement Vol.).
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on how such hearings are to be conducted could be of substantial
benefit to settling the expectations of the agencies and the public.
To nurture understanding that the hearing is only a legislative
hearing, unconfined by the requirements of notice and an opportunity to be heard applicable in adjudicatory proceedings, could
do much to alleviate the clamor likely to arise from those persons
accustomed to the latter.
No matter what the substantive and procedural qualities of
legislative review, whether imposed by statute or voluntarily by
the Committee, the underlying theme of legislative review is political review of agency rules. Some might view the process as undesirable for that very reason, or urge that institutions such as the
Committee conduct their affairs "above politics." The fact remains that political review exists, and, properly so, regardless of
whether it is formal or informal in nature. Yet, formal review,
especially where it is so much a part of the rule-making process as
it is in West Virginia, does carry some added obligations. Without
lecturing elected representatives on the resolution of political matters, a few observations may be useful to an appreciation of legislative review and its relationship to rule making. First, legislative
review provides aggrieved persons another "bite at the apple,"
since they are afforded rights to participate in the rule-making
process before the agency. This may be precisely the situation
where legislative review is most needed, if the agency has acted
without regard to legislative intent, but at the same time the Committee should be watchful for efforts to overturn in the Legislature
that which was properly decided on the merits before the agency.
Second, in many situations the very reason for which the agency
was created was to provide decisions based on informed judgment
and expertise. The Committee should consider carefully any action
which has the effect of substituting its judgment for that of the
agency on matters where informed judgment and expertise are
essential. Finally, the Committee might do well to resist the understandable temptation to counsel an agency on how it could do what
the Committee has concluded it could not do in the form of the
proposed rule it has rejected. The affirmative duty to draft rules
properly lies with the agency. If this were not the case, the need
for having agencies at all would be questionable.
2.

The Role of the Legislature with Respect to Actions of the
Legislative Rule-making Review Committee
The 1976 Amendments provide for oversight by the full Legis-
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lature with respect to actions of the Legislative Rule-making Review Committee. The Committee Co-chairmen are instructed to
submit copies of all proposed rules considered by the Committee
to their respective houses of the Legislature.1 12 In light of the statute's purposes, this requirement apparently would apply only to
proposals considered and acted upon by the Committee and not
those still pending. The copies must be submitted no later than
thirty days before the end of each regular legislative session and
referred to the appropriate standing committee in each house for
consideration.7 3 Orderly and efficient performance of the duties of
the full Legislature would be facilitated by continuous submission
of proposals to it on a regular basis as the Committee completes
its work on individual proposals. If there should be any inclination
to forward all proposals in a single package at the deadline in the
hope that the attention of the Legislature will be diverted to the
normal press of Legislative business toward the close of the session
the temptation should be resisted on the premise that deliberate
and informed decisions are preferrable to ill-conceived and hasty
ones.
A proposal which has received the Committee's approval is
permitted to become effective shortly after approval, but simply
because it is in effect does not mean it will stay in effect. Under
the statute, the Legislature may sustain or reverse, in whole or in
part, the action of the Committee on a rule. This is accomplished
by concurrent resolution of the Legislature. 4 In this respect, the
1976 Amendments go beyond even the Connecticut system of legislative review which provides for submission of only those rules
disapproved by the Legislative Regulation Review Committee to
the full General Assembly, which in turn may sustain or reverse
the Committee's disapproval by concurrent resolution.'75 The Legislature is not compelled to act at all, but the fact that it may,
creates the possibility that rights and obligations under the rule
will have a limited life expectancy. If the Legislature reverses
Committee approval and thereby renders a final rule no longer
effective, rights and obligations incurred while the rule was in
effect should not be affected, 7 ' but as a practical matter the impact may still be disruptive.
,72W. VA. CODE ANN. § 29A-3-12 (1976 Replacement Vol.).
373 Id.
174Id.

§ 4-171 (Supp. 1977).
Cf. Crank v. McLaughlin, 125 W. Va. 126, 131, 23 S.E.2d 56, 59 (1942). This

17' CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
"M
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Reversal of Committee approval, however, is likely to be rare,
and there is no reason why the Legislature should not consider the
impact of the reversal of a decision now represented by a final and
effective rule in reaching its ultimate decision on the rule. Nor are
the agencies powerless to take appropriate steps in anticipation of
reversal by concurrent resolution. If, for example, a proposal is
approved by the Committee only by a narrow margin and dissenters indicate their intention to pursue the matter in the full Legislature, the agency has the option of providing a later effective date
for the rule. It does not appear that the possibility of reversal exists
indefinitely. A fair reading of the statute suggests that the Legislature must act, if at all, during the regular session in which the
proposal is submitted to it by the Committee. If the Legislature
fails to act on an approved rule by the end of the session, legislative
review is complete and the rule stands, subject to change only by
means other than legislative review under the 1976 Amendments.
The procedure for proposed rules disapproved by the Committee is slightly more complicated. Upon referral of a rule which the
Committee has disapproved, in whole or in part, to the appropriate
standing committee of the Legislature, the standing committee is
required to schedule hearings on the rule. As with approved proposals, the Legislature is not required to sustain or reverse the
committee on disapproved rules. Failure to act permits the committee's decision to stand, with one exception. 7 If the proposed
rule is one designed to implement a federally subsidized or assisted
program, the Legislature must sustain disapproval by concurrent
resolution; otherwise its failure to act will be deemed a reversal of
the Committee, and the proposed rule will become effective thirty
days after the adjournment sine die of the regular session or later
if the agency so chooses.' Generally legislative action on a rule by
way of concurrent resolution is effective on the date of adoption of
the resolution, provided the clerk of the house in which the resolucase indicates that "[n]o one has a vested right in any law or ordinance, in the
sense that a continuance thereof may be demanded, although rights accruing
thereunder are always protected up to the time of any repeal or modification
thereof." The Oklahoma statute deals with the issue in providing that "[any
rights, privileges, or interests gained by any person by operation of an agency rule
prior to its rejection or disapproval by either house of the Legislature, shall not be
affected by reason of any subsequent disapproval or rejection ... " OKLA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 75, § 308(f) (1976).
I"W. VA. CoDE ANN. § 29A-3-12 (1976 Replacement Vol.).

173
Id.
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tion originated files forthwith a copy of the resolution in the state
register and with the agency affected. This is not the case if the
resolution makes effective a rule disapproved by the Committee.
The resurrected rule becomes effective thirty days after filing of
the resolution in the state register or on the effective date proposed
by the agency, whichever is later." 9
Thus, the full Legislature as well as the Legislative Rulemaking Review Committee is part of the rule-making process. As
such, its action or inaction will bear considerably on the efficiency
and effectiveness with which policy is developed and implemented
through agency rules.
3.

Legislative Review and Constitutional Issues

Formal programs for legislative review of administrative rules
occasionally have been the subject of controversy for constitutional
reasons. Normally, the concern lies not with what a legislature
seeks to accomplish in the course of legislative review, but rather
with how it accomplishes its objective. A legislature's right to
enact legislation which overturns administrative rules and regulations is not likely to be questioned, but formal procedures for legislative review often reach the same result by means other than the
ordinary. This is the source of much of the debate.
More than in any other system of legislative review in existence at this time, the various constitutional issues which have been
of concern elsewhere are reflected in the West Virginia approach.
Under the 1976 Amendments the Legislative Rule-making Review
Committee possesses the power to veto proposed rules under its
approval authority, although there is no definition of the intended
scope of its review. The Committee's decisions in turn are subject
to review by the full Legislature which may overturn a Committee
decision of approval or disapproval of a rule by concurrent resolution. Most jurisdictions having formal legislative review have been
much less ambitious. The majority allow the full legislature to
overrule rules only by the traditional law-making means of statutory enactments, whether there is a preliminary committee review
for the purpose of making recommendations, committee review
with a power of temporary suspension, or no preliminary committee review at all. 8 ' Of those states which permit disapproval of
i' Id.
, ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 6-610, -612 (1976); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 11.60(2)(e) (Supp.
1976); IOWA CODE ANN. § 17A.8 (Supp. 1977); KA. STAT. ANN. § 77-426 (Supp.
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rules by either concurrent or joint resolution of the full legislature,

most provide for review of only final rules, either by the legislature
itself in the first instance, or after preliminary committee recommendations.'81 Only West Virginia and Connecticut allow binding
committee approval or disapproval of proposed rules, which is final
unless the full legislature acts by concurrent resolution.'82 Michigan is the only other state which confers powers of this magnitude,
but even there committee disapproval results only in suspension
of the rule, pending introduction and passage of a concurrent resolution in the full legislature. If the disapproval is not sustained, the
rule stands.'83
The relatively cautious approach represented in so many of
these jurisdictions may reflect to some degree concern over how far
legislative review might extend and remain invulnerable to constitutional challenge. The experience in Wisconsin and Michigan and
to a lesser extent in New Hampshire is instructive. When Wisconsin enacted a statute in 1953 providing for legislative disapproval
of final agency rules by joint resolution of the legislature, the Wisconsin Attorney General declared the law violative of a constitutional provision which provided that "no law shall be enacted except by bill."'84 Today, rules may be overturned in Wisconsin only
by statute. 8 5 Michigan once had a legislative review program
which allowed abrogation of rules by legislative committee, pending reinstatement by the committee or by concurrent resolution of
the legislature. In 1953 Michigan's Attorney General "declared the
entire process of legislative review unconstitutional as a legislative
18 Subsequently,
encroachment on the functions of the judiciary.""
the Michigan Constitution was amended to allow the committee
1976); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13.087(9) (Supp. 1976); MD. ANN. CODE art. 40, § 40A
(Supp. 1976); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 3.965(2) (Supp. 1977); Mo. ANN. STAT. §
536.037.4 (Supp. 1976); NEB. REv. STAT. § 84-904(2) (Cum. Supp. 1976); ORE. REv.
STAT. § 171.713 (1975); S.D. COMPLED LAWS ANN. § 1-26-1.1 (Supp. 1977); WAsH.
REv. CODE ANN. § 34.04.160 (1965); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 13.56(2) (Supp. 1977).
"I ALAsKA STAT. § 44.62.320 (1976); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 67-5218 (Supp. 1977);
MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 82.4203.1(4) (Supp. 1975); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 75, §
308 (1976); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 3, § 819(c), (Supp. 1977).
"" CONN. GEN. STAT. REV. § 4-171 (Supp. 1976); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 29A-3-12
(1976 Replacement Vol.).
H*MicH. STAT. ANN. § 3.560(145)(4)-(5) (Supp. 1977).
'3 COOPER, supra note 30, at 229; see Helstad, supra note 69, at 428.
Wis. STAT. ANN. § 13.53 (Supp. 1977).
" COOPER, supra note 30, at 227; see Schubert, Legislative Adjudication of
Administrative Legislation, 7 J. Pus. LAW 135, 157-58 (1958).
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and concurrent resolution technique of legislative review.'87 In New
Hampshire, in 1950, constitutional issues arose concerning a statute which gave the Governor authority to submit reorganization
plans to the legislature which would become effective twenty-five
days after submission, if the legislature did not reject the plan by
concurrent resolution. The Governor requested an opinion of the
New Hampshire Supreme Court, and the court declared the statute to be unconstitutional on grounds of departure from customary
and constitutionally mandated law-making procedures.",
Developments of this nature at the state level and selective
but infrequent applications of legislative review principles by Congress have sparked controversy focused primarily on questions of
constitutionality. 9 This has been particularly intense where legislative review includes a provision for action by concurrent resolution rather than by bill. The primary concern has been elimination
of the executive's veto power when the power is inapplicable to
concurrent resolutions. 9 ' It has been suggested that this does not
in fact limit the control of the executive as a practical matter 9 and
that there is a legitimate need for legislative review which is constitutionally supportable."2 From these discussions, three general
lines for inquiry emerge. First, does legislative review violate the
concept of separation of powers by intruding upon the general
prerogatives of the executive branch? Second, is the separation
concept violated by intrusion upon the judicial function of deciding cases involving the legality of agency rules? Finally, does law
making by concurrent resolution improperly deny the executive its
veto power over legislation?
All of these questions are implicit in the form of legislative
"

COOPER,

supra note 30, at 227.

,nOpinion of the Justices, 83 A.2d 738 (N.H. 1950).
"' Cf. Boisvert, supra note 135; Grinnane, The Control of FederalAdministration by Congressional Resolutions and Committees, 66 HAav. L. REV. 569 (1953);

Melville, supra note 135; Schwartz, supra note 13; Watson, CongressSteps Out: A
Look at CongressionalControl of the Executive, 63 CAuLF. L. REv. 983 (1975); Note,
Congressional Veto of Administrative Action: The ProbableResponse to Constitutional Challenge, 1976 DuKE L.J. 285 (1976); Note, Can The Joint Administrative
Procedures Committee Adequately Solve Administrative Conflict, 4 FLA. ST. L.
REv. 350, 359-61 (1976); Note, 65 HIv.L. REv. 637, 646-48 (1952).

See Grinnane, supra note 189, at 593-99.
See Boisvert, supra note 135, at 651-57.
See Melville, supra note 135, at 51-53; Schwartz, supra note 13, at 523, 533;
Schwartz, Legislative Control of Administrative Rules and Regulations: I. The
UO

"
'

American Experience, 30 N.Y.U.L. REV. 1031, 1041-44 (1955).
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review provided in the 1976 Amendments. No attempt is made to
resolve them here because the primary purpose of this article relates to rights, responsibilities and procedures under the statute
itself rather than its underlying constitutionality. Nevertheless,
the basic issues in the context of West Virginia law merit brief
consideration. No doubt their ultimate resolution must come from
the Supreme Court of Appeals.
Historically the Supreme Court of Appeals has exhibited an
inclination to preserve the separation of power between the
branches of government. It has been persistent and aggressive to
this end. In 1951, it was observed that "[o]ur court seems to take
pride in the fact that it has in recent years, and contrary to the
general trend, adopted a 'new and strict rule' concerning the separation of powers .

. . ."

" This did not occur without criticism.

Professor Davis notes that "[w]hat is thought to be a perversion
of the doctrine of separation of powers has culminated in a series
of cases decided since 1931 which, it is believed, have quite unnecessarily held several important statutes unconstitutional and cast
doubt upon the constitutionality of much existing legislation."''
There is little doubt but that the court's acute sensitivity to preservation of separation of powers can be attributed to the express
provision in the Constitution of West Virginia which provides that
[t]he legislative, executive and judicial departments shall be
separate and distinct, so that neither shall exercise the powers
properly belonging to either of the others; nor shall any person
exercise the powers of more than one of them at the same time,
except95 that justices of the peace shall be eligible to the legislature."
It appears that this attitude persists and that separation of powers
is likely to be guarded carefully.' Should the Legislature disapprove an administrative rule, those wishing to see the rule sustained might do well to explore the matter and consider raising the
issue in litigation.
The manner in which the Legislature is entitled to disapprove
"1 Colson, Some Elementary Principles of ConstitutionalLaw, 53 W. VA. L.
REv. 117, 119 (1950).
,9 Davis, supra note 16, at 272.
US W. VA. CONsT. art. V, § 1.
"' State ex rel. Brotherton v. Blankenship, 214 S.E.2d 467 (W. Va. 1975); State
ex rel. Canterbury v. County Court, 151 W. Va. 1013, 158 S.E.2d 151 (1967); see
State ex rel. County Court v. Demus, 148 W. Va. 398, 135 S.E.2d 449 (1964).
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a rule under the 1976 Amendments also deserves consideration.
Various provisions in the West Virginia Constitution address the
proper form for exercise of legislative proceedings, the origination
' The
of bills, the reading of bills, their amendment and so forth. 97
1976 Amendments are silent on the applicability of these provisions to legislative action with respect to administrative rules, but
if the Legislature acts on a rule in a manner inconsistent with these
constitutional provisions, certainly the issue is presented of
whether compliance with constitutionally mandated legislative
procedure is required in this special case.' 8
There is the question of eliminating the Governor's veto by
proceeding by concurrent resolution. The West Virginia Constitution requires that bills be presented to the Governor before they
become law for approval, subject to veto which in turn is subject
to override by the Legislature.'99 The requirement is considered to
be mandatory. As the Supreme Court of Appeals confirmed in a
recent case, "the provision of the Constitution which requires presentation of a bill to the Governor before it shall become a law is
mandatory and that in the absence of such presentation the enactment of the statute is a nullity. '' 20 Once more, the constitutional

issue created by the 1976 Amendments is obvious.
The probable response of the Supreme Court of Appeals to
these constitutional questions seems difficult to predict. Perhaps
to some extent this is attributable to the magnitude of the principles which necessarily collide. At its most fundamental level the
issue is the proper balance to be maintained in the workings of
government.
IV.

DEPARTURES FROM RULE-MAKING PROCEDURES AND THEIR
IMPACT ON THE VAUDITY OF RuLEs

The procedural requirements which pervade the development
of administrative rules resemble a maze marked with innumerable
pitfalls for the unwary. It is not difficult to generate sympathy
toward those who bear the responsibility for procedural compliance in rule making and particularly toward the agencies and the
W. VA. CONST. art. VI, §§ 24, 28, 29, 31.
i See generally Horack, ConstitutionalLimitations on Legislative Procedure
in West Virginia, 39 W. VA. L.Q. 294 (1933).
"' W. VA. CONST. art. VII, § 14.
State ex rel. Browning v. Blankenship, 154 W.Va. 253, 266, 175 S.E.2d 172,
180 (1970); cf. In Re Adkins, 83 W.Va. 673, 98 S.E. 888 (1919).
"'
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Secretary of State whose burdens, unlike those of the Legislature,
are not self-imposed. Admittedly, these responsibilities are great
and demand a commitment of resources and effort. Yet there are
equally dramatic benefits to be realized in terms of public notice
and participation, and it is to this side that the Legislature has
tipped the balance under the 1964 Act and to an even greater
extent under the 1976 Amendments.
The Legislature anticipated that all agencies could not be
expected to shoulder their responsibilities for rule-making procedures with equal zeal. As an incentive to those less than enthralled
with the virtues of public notice and participation, the Legislature
adopted the principle that departures from prescribed procedure
may render the rule ineffective and applied the principle in various
ways at various points in the rule-making process.
In this section, the opportunities for departure from procedure
and the probable consequences are considered. The discussion focuses on these issues at the level of the agencies and the Secretary
of State. Ultimately, this analysis provides the framework for determining whether a particular agency rule is vulnerable on account of adoption without compliance with statutory rule-making
procedures. The relevance of these procedures is greater than one
might expect. The relative simplicity of the prescribed procedures
is deceptive and is not an indicator of the probability of compliance. Reports are numerous of deficiencies in procedural compliance on the part of agencies and others in various jurisdictions. 0 ,
There is no reason to believe that a different situation exists in
West Virginia today.
A. ProceduralIrregularitiesand the Administrative Agencies
A preceding section presented a detailed discussion of the
rule-making responsibilities of the administrative agencies both
before and after enactment of the 1976 Amendments.0 This dis2'
Beasley, Publication Under the New Tennessee Uniform Administrative
ProceduresAct and the Public's Right to Know, 6 MEMPH. ST. L. REv. 187, 194

(1976); see Boone, An Examination of the Tennessee Law of Administrative
Procedure, 1 VAN.

L. Rav. 339, 351-52 (1948); O'Leary, supra note 115, at 69-71;

Note, 1Aniz. L. REv. 329, 330 (1959); Louisiana's"New"Administrative Procedure
Act, Highlights of the 1974 Regular Session Legislative Symposium, 35 LA. L. Rv.

629, 638 (1975); Comment, The Quest for Justice in Maine Administrative Procedure: The Administrative Code in Application and Theory, 18 U. ME. L. REV. 218,
231 (1966).
2
See generally text accompanying notes 66-112 supra.

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol79/iss4/3

52

Neely: Rights and Responsibilities in Administrative Rule Making in West
ADMINISTRATIVE RULE MAKING
cussion serves more than an interest in historical perspective or
thoroughness since the 1976 Amendments apply only to rules and
regulations promulgated after their effective date, June 7, 1976.113
This interest also goes beyond transitional problems in converting
from one set of procedural requirements to another since there are
at this time many administrative rules which were promulgated
prior to June 7, 1976, and which are still in effect. The validity of
these rules must be tested against the procedures in effect prior to
that date since the 1976 Amendments provide that "[e]very rule
or regulation heretofore lawfully promulgated pursuant to the prior
provisions of this article shall remain in full force and effect. .. ."I" Rules promulgated before July 1, 1964 (the effective
date of the 1964 Act), have been relegated to the realm of historical
curiosity for present purposes. Conceivably such rules still exist.
If so, their validity must be assessed in light of the specific procedures applicable at the time, a time during which there was no
comprehensive administrative procedure act in West Virginia.
Actually, there was a requirement enacted in 1955 that agency
rules be filed with the Secretary of State.0 5 Fortunately, the 1964
Act eliminated the need to inquire concerning the filing of a rule
under the earlier provision because it required agencies to compile
and index all rules in force and effect on July 1, 1964, and file them
with the Secretary of State.0 6 In the event of failure to file the Act
provided such rules "not so filed shall become void and unenforceable and shall be of no legal force and effect."2 7 This provides an
initial point for analysis, if the unlikely occasion arises to examine
the validity of a rule adopted before July 1, 1964.
Once it is established or conceded that agency action constitutes rule making subject to the requirements of the Act, the validity of the rule from a procedural standpoint turns in part on
whether the agency strayed from the prescribed path in adopting
it.
For rules promulgated under the 1964 Act prior to its amendment, the first subject for inquiry is the notice given by the agency
of its proposed rule. The Act required that written notice be given
in the form and with the content prescribed by statute to those
M

W.

VA. CODE ANN.

§ 29A-3-3 (1976 Replacement Vol.).

W. VA. CODE ANN. § 29A-3-15 (1976 Replacement Vol.).
2 Acts of the 52d W. Va. Leg. ch. 159, Reg. Sess. [1955].
M' W. VA. CODE ANN. § 29A-2-1(a) (1976 Replacement Vol.).
2"

27

Id.
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requesting it."' Determining compliance on this point may present
some difficulty, especially with older rules. Agency records are the
most likely source of this information and may prove difficult to
locate, if they still exist.
A search to determine the adequacy of notice provided for
proposed rule making is not without the prospect of substantial
rewards for the person challenging the rule because the law provided that "no rule hereafter adopted is valid unless adopted in
substantial compliance" with these notice requirements."' D Although technical errors in form or content will not provide the
basis for defeat of the rule, substantial defects will. As a general
proposition, "substantial compliance is achieved when the statutory purposes are accomplished, regardless of minor ommissions." 2 1 It has been suggested that this approach to substantial
compliance has full judicial support.2 1 The fact that the relevant
evidence on this matter is likely to be in the agency's possession
suggests that it would not be unreasonable to place the burden of
the agency rather than
demonstrating procedural compliance on
212
on the person challenging the regulation.
The problems of proof are less difficult and the issue of burden
of proof is of less practical significance for final rules than for
proposed rules under the 1964 Act. The statute provided that final
rules, following public notice and participation, "shall not become
effective unless and until two certified copies of such rule have
been on file in the office of the secretary of state for thirty consecu21

Acts of the 56th W. Va. Leg. ch. 1, § 29A-3-2, Reg. Sess. [1964] (amended

and reenacted 1976).

m Id.
210Merrill,

Oklahomas New Administrative ProcedureAct, 17

OKLA.

L. REV.

1, 18 (1964).
211 Id.
212This approach would not appear to be unprecedented in West Virginia in
at least a criminal law context where, of course, the burden is customarily on the

prosecution. See State v. Bunner, 126 W. Va. 280, 289-90, 27 S.E.2d 823, 828 (1943).

The court stated, "The indictment is further defective in that it does not allege that
the regulations came into effect on or before the date of the alleged violation . ...
It was imperative that this indictment should show the regulations to have been
brought effectively into force before their alleged violation. Courts do not take
judicial notice of municipal ordinances. No more liberal rule is possible as to regula-

tions of a mere administrative body or official." (footnotes omitted). See People v.
Calabro, 7 Misc. 2d 732, 170 N.Y.S.2d 876 (1957) (requiring dismissal of an information charging violation of a rule for failure of proof of required filing with the
Secretary of State).
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tive days. ' 21 3 This requirement applied not only to final rules for
which public notice and participation was required prior to adoption, but also to agencies, such as the214Public Service Commission,
whose final rules need only be filed.
To establish that an agency has discharged its procedural responsibilities under the 1976 Amendments for rules promulgated
after June 7, 1976, is in most instances a simple task because both
notice of proposed rule making and final rules must be filed in the
state register by the agency. The same is true for the notice of
hearing and final findings and determinations on statutory conditions precedent to rule making. For rules which must be presented
to the Legislative Rule-making Review Committee for approval,
the agency also is required to include in its notice of a final rule a
certificate showing the date of presentation of the proposed rule to
the Committee.
Consideration should also be given to the question of whether
the agency has lawfully promulgated procedural rules which are
mandatory under the Act. It has been suggested that failure to
adopt procedural rules should be considered "prima facie, as substantial error," although it seems that Massachusetts' courts have
been "somewhat inclined to adopt a benign attitude towards the
procedural misadventures of administrative agencies, especially
the lack of adequate rules." ' This should not lead one to conclude
that the point is without merit. The policy underlying this requirement is sound and needs only a firm judicial stand to make clear
to agencies that the courts will compel what the legislature has
required. In this situation the Supreme Court of Oklahoma met the
challenge and concluded that the State Professional Practices
Commission was not entitled to conduct hearings until such time
as it adopted rules governing hearings on complaints, as required
21
under the Oklahoma Administrative Procedures Act. 1
This leads to the basic and pervasive question of what are to
be the consequences of, for example, failure to make the appropriate filing with the Secretary of State. The Legislature has spoken
23 Acts of the 56th W. Va. Leg. ch. 1, § 29A-3-4, Reg. Sess. [1964 (amended
and reenacted 1976).
M1W. VA. CoDE ANN. § 29A-1-2 (1976 Replacement Vol.).
1,5
Crowther, The Massachusetts and Federal Efforts to Establish Uniform
ProceduralRules for AdministrativeAgencies, 24 AD. L. Rav. 213, 215-18 (1972).
="Adams v. Professional Practices Comm'n, 524 P.2d 932, 933-34 (Okl. 1974);
cf. In re Rules and Regulations, 118 Ohio App. 407, 195 N.E.2d 112 (1963).
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frequently and clearly on the matter in the past and continued in
this vein in the 1976 Amendments, which state that
[a]ny rules or regulations promulgated after the effective date
of this section [June 7, 1976] and any amendment promulgated hereafter to any rule or regulation heretofore promulgated
under the delegation of the power of the legislature or otherwise
shall only be effective if promulgated in accordance with the
provisions of this article." 7
It is difficult to see how the Legislature could have been more
specific on the sanction for non-compliance. If, for example, an
agency fails to make the required filing, its rule is not effective.
Generally, the statute requires this result without qualification,
although the slightly relaxed standard of substantial compliance
has been retained in the 1976 Amendments for notice of proposed
2
rule making. 1
In most cases, the permanent register in the Office of the
Secretary of State is the source for the information relating to
procedural compliance, and inquiry need not be confined to determining that the rule was filed. As to final rules, examination of the
document itself may be fruitful. Unlike the provision for proposed
rules, this portion of the law makes no reference to the sufficiency
of substantial compliance. Arguably, compliance must be absolute
in order for a rule to become effective. One court has held a rule
invalid for non-compliance for the reason that the rule filed did not
bear the requisite certification." 9 (Note that the West Virginia
statute requires filing of two certified copies. 220 ) The result is a
harsh one when a rule is declared invalid for lack of a required
certification, and such a result is subject to the legitimate criticism
that form has been allowed to prevail over substance. In the case
in question, the Arizona Commission of Agriculture and Horticulture had promulgated a rule in order to control an apparently
persistent creature known as the Pink Bollworm of Cotton. The
rule required that planters plow under the remnants of the cotton
crop left after harvest. The defendant, Wacker, was charged with
a misdemeanor for failure to comply with the rule. The Supreme
Court of Appeals of Arizona declared the rule invalid for lack of
217

W. VA. CODE ANN. § 29A-3-3 (1976 Replacement Vol.).
§ 29A-3-8 (1976 Replacement Vol.).
State v. Wacker, 86 Ariz. 247, 344 P.2d 1004 (1959).
W. VA. CODE ANN. § 29A-1-2 (1976 Replacement Vol.).

Z W. VA. CODE ANN.
229
220
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the required certification, even though the rule had been deposited
and filed with the Secretary of State.2 1
As an extreme case State v. Wacker is useful. Although the
Supreme Court of Appeals of Arizona did not elaborate on the
basis for its decision and thus appears to have insisted on strict
compliance for its own sake, it does not follow necessarily that
there is no conceivable justification for its decision. A critic of the
court's decision, in concluding that it had carried the rule of strict
construction beyond the reason for its existence, noted
"[n]evertheless, the interpretation rendered will awaken state
administrative agencies from their incautious slumber to a sharpened awareness of procedural requirements animated by this decision.

1 2
22

Yet State v. Wacker should alert one to the basic question

of when does a procedural requirement transcend the level of incidental technicality to an extent which justifies that its violation
results in invalidation of a rule. Unless this question is given due
consideration, one might conclude that all procedural requirements are mere technicalities to be overlooked whenever they
threaten to have any effect and thereby totally ignore the statutory
language prescribing invalidity for non-compliance. This question
is imperative in situations where the lapse concerns a matter of
more than passing consequence, such as a failure to file a rule with
the Secretary of State.
The result which should follow from failure to file seems clear
in light of the language of the statute and has been recognized by
the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia. One issue in the
case of Sheppe v. Board of Dental Examinersn was the validity of
rules on which the Board relied in part in refusing to provide an
applicant a required examination. The rules had not been filed
with the Secretary of State under the 1955 law which required
filing, in the absence of which the rule would "become void and
unenforceable and shall be of no legal force and effect."2 4 Since the
rule had not been filed, the court concluded that "the rules and
regulations relied upon in this case are null and void and have no
application thereto whatsoever.

.

. The state through its agencies

has a right to control and regulate professions but such regulations
22
2
2

State v. Wacker, 86 Ariz. 247, 252, 344 P.2d 1004, 1008 (1959).
1 ARiz. L. REV. 329, 331 (1959).

Sheppe v. Board of Dental Examiners, 147 W. Va. 473, 128 S.E.2d 620

(1962).
12

Acts of the 52d W. Va. Leg. ch. 159, Reg. Sess. [1955].
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.. . must conform to the laws made and provided for in such cases
. .
"..2)5One might view this case as unduly literal in its approach

to a technicality. There is no indiqation that the applicant was
prejudiced as a consequence of the Board's failure to file, but the
decision fulfills a more far-reaching objective. At that time the
Legislature had concluded that public notice of agency rules was
to be achieved by filing. Had the court reached any other conclusion the intent of the Legislature would have been frustrated and
the public at large denied notice in the manner prescribed. In this
light, the technicality goes beyond the trivial. As Professor Cooper
has suggested, "[i]t cannot be expected that agencies will, if left
to their own devices, fully comply with public information provisions that are merely directory.""22 Therefore, effective sanctions
for non-compliance are essential, and the West Virginia Legislature provided accordingly. Results of the nature of that in Sheppe
v. Board of Dental Examiners are not at all extraordinary. Numerous jurisdictions have reached comparable results in similar
cases."' The fact is that "the state courts have been inclined to
enforce strictly the requirements as to filing of rules, and to hold
1,,29
that a rule not filed is not enforceable ....
B. ProceduralIrregularitiesand the Secretary of State
A conclusion that an agency has satisfied its procedural obligations under the Act does not dispense with the necessity of further inquiry since the agencies are but one aspect of the total rulemaking process. The responsibilities of others and the extent to
-2 Sheppe v. Board of Dental Examiners, 147 W. Va. 473, 483, 128 S.E.2d 620,
626 (1943).
2' COOPER, supra note 30, at 170.
22
See Mogis v. Lyman-Richey Sand & Gravel Corp., 189 F.2d 130 (8th Cir.
1951); Todd v. State, 205 Ga. 363, 53 S.E.2d 906 (1949); Otani v. Contractor's
License Board, 51 Hawaii 673, 466 P.2d 1009 (1970); State ex rel. Sights v. Edwards,
228 Ind. 13, 89 N.E.2d 443 (1950); Shearer v. Dailey, 312 Ky. 226, 226 S.W.2d 955
(1950); Commissioner, Dep't. of Community Affairs v. Boston Redevelopment Authority, 362 Mass. 602, 289 N.E.2d 867 (1972); Kneeland Liquor, Inc. v. Alcoholic
Beverages Control Comm'n, 345 Mass. 228, 186 N.E.2d 593 (1962); People v. Cull,
10 N.Y.2d 123, 218 N.Y.S.2d 38, 176 N.E.2d 495 (1961); State ex rel. Board of
Education v. Holt, 174 Ohio St. 55, 186 N.E.2d 862 (1962); Jamison Plumbing
& Heating Co. v. Rose, 14 Ohio App. 2d 47, 236 N.E.2d 561 (1967); Adams v.
Professional Practices Comm'n, 524 P.2d 932 (Okla. 1974); State v. Freeman, 370
P.2d 307 (Okla. 1962); Wisconsin Telephone Co. v. Department of Indus., Labor
and Human Relations, 68 Wis. 2d 345, 228 N.W.2d 649 (1975); Mondovi Coop.
Equity Ass'n. v. State, 258 Wis. 505, 46 N.W.2d 825 (1951).
-'
COOPER, supra note 30, at 211.
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which their responsibilities have been discharged in a particular
case must be considered to determine whether lapses in their execution have any impact on a rule's validity.
The obligations of the Office of the Secretary of State under
the 1964 Act and the 1976 Amendments are primarily in the nature
of repository and publisher of information pertaining to the rulemaking process. A breakdown in the performance of either of these
functions can undermine to a substantial degree fundamental
rights of public notice and participation concerning agency rule
making. Arguably, the remedy on such occasions lies in a mandamus proceeding to compel the government official to perform his
duty"29 because the duties pertaining to rule making appear to be
more mandatory than discretionary. Perhaps in some circumstances there might be a basis for maintaining a private action for
damages against the government official for individual harm arising out of the official's deficient performance."' This section, however, is devoted to the probable consequences with regard to the
validity of rules and to the overall operation of the rule-making
process, rather than to the direct remedies which may be available
against government officials.
For notice of proposed rule making the 1964 Act relied on the
agencies alone, and for notice of final rules, on the Office of the
Secretary of State. There is no indication that fulfilling the essentially passive, repository requirement of a permanent register for
final rules in the Office of the Secretary of State has presented
problems. Although volume alone may cause difficulty in searching for particular rules, the fact remains that the rules filed are
there.
2 There would appear to be no administrative remedy available directly
against the Secretary of State which otherwise must be exhausted in order to bring
a mandamus proceeding. Cf. Capitol Business Equip., Inc. v. Gates, 155 W. Va.
260, 263, 184 S.E.2d 125, 126 (1971). Even when an administrative remedy exists,
a writ of mandamus will be awarded in cases of unconscionable or undue delay. See
Kanawha Valley Transp. Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 219 S.E.2d 332 (W. Va.
1975); Village of Bridgeport, Ohio v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 125 W. Va. 342, 24
S.E.2d 285 (1914); 1A M.J. Administrative Law, § 23 (1967). The nature of the
Secretary of State's responsibilities in this instance also would seem to be ministerial in nature. The Supreme Court of Appeals has stated in another context that
"where ... no element of discretion is left as to the precise mode of its performance, such duty is ministerial, and a writ of mandamus is proper to compel its
performance." Mountaineer Disposal Serv., Inc. v. Dyer, 197 S.E.2d 111, 115, (W.
Va. 1973).

2 See generally 1A M.J. Administrative Law § 24 (1967).
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The publication responsibilities have been and remain an
apparent source of difficulty for the Office of the Secretary of State
and a source of aggravation for the public. The publication requirements under the 1964 Act were not incidental to its primary purposes nor tucked away and intertwined in provisions on other matters. A separate section of the statute, § 29A-3-7, concerned solely
the publication responsibilities of the Office of the Secretary of
State. 3' No pamphlets of agency rules and no quarterly bulletins
have ever been published and made available to the public, as
clearly and unambiguously required by law .3 2
Launching a comprehensive publication program of the variety envisioned under the 1964 Act is a project of some magnitude.
The Legislature was not unaware of this, and the Secretary of
State was not given a fixed time in which to institute the program.
He was instructed to publish "as soon as practicable" after January 1, 1965.m Nor did the Legislature ignore the practical realities
and the problems which its demands might produce. It gave the
Secretary discretionary authority to omit from publication materials "the publication of which would be unduly cumbersome, expensive or otherwise inexpedient."" 4 This discretionary power was
not unlimited; it was conditional. Under the Act, the Secretary
could omit publication only "if such rules are made available in
printed or processed form on application to the adopting agency,
and if the publication in pamphlet form or the quarterly bulletins
contain a statement stating the general subject matter of the rules
so omitted and stating how copies thereof may be obtained.""23 The
Secretary was not given an option not to publish at all but only
an opportunity to simplify the content of the publication.
Nor did the Legislature ignore expense of publication. It provided a means by which publication could be accomplished on a
generally self-sustaining basis, thus realizing a significant reduction in cost to the state. The pamphlets and quarterly publications
" Acts of the 56th W. Va. Leg. ch. 1, § 29A-3-7, Reg. Sess. [1964] (amended
and reenacted 1976).
"I See Letter from Edgar F. Heiskell III, Secretary of State, to William E.
Johnson, October 9, 1973; letter from John D. Rockefeller, IV, Secretary of State,
to William E. Johnson, on file in West Virginia University College of Law Library.
11 Acts of the 56th W. Va. Leg. ch. 1, § 29A-3-7(a) Reg. Sess. [1964] (amended
and reenacted 1976).
n' Acts of the 56th W. Va. Leg. ch. 1, § 29A-3-7(c), Reg. Sess. [1964] (amended
and reenacted 1976).
= Id.
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were to be available without charge only to state officials. All others were to pay for them at a price fixed by the Secretary of State
to cover the cost of publication and mailing, with receipts deposited in the state treasury to the credit of the state general fund.26
It has been suggested that failure on the part of the Legislature to appropriate funds for publication has been the reason for
failure to publish. Other states have had similar experiences.27
Perhaps this is so and can be appreciated only by those initiated
in subtle intricacies of the appropriations process. This might be
more convincing if the burden of publication were greater; however, the Act presents explicitly the means for shifting much of the
burden from the Secretary of State. The costs of publication and
mailing paid from an appropriation would be reimbursed to the
state by subscription fees charged to the public. If the Secretary
of State set the price properly, reimbursement of these costs could
have been virtually total. Thus, with this burden shifted to the
public, the drain on public funds would have been merely temporary.
Admittedly, there would have been administrative costs
which the Secretary of State would have had to bear, but even here
there was an opportunity to shift much of the burden elsewhere.
The 1964 Act authorized the Secretary to "prescribe by rule a
standard size, format and numbering system for rules to be filed
in his office, making exception where rules issued by other agencies
cannot effectively convey necessary information within the size
and format established."' 8 At the Secretary of State's disposal was
the power to insist on the form for rules filed with him and the
equally necessary right to refuse to accept those which did not
follow the prescribed form. There is no reason why this power
might not have been used to prescribe a form suitable for transmission directly to a printer, thereby assuring a substantial reduction
in the administrative burdens of publication on the Office of the
Secretary of State.
For these reasons the necessary appropriation need not have
been of overwhelming proportions, and presumably the Legislature
2MId.
231 See Hazard, The Oregon Administrative Procedure Act: Status and
Prospects,39 OR. L. REv. 97, 106 (1960); Comment, The Quest for Justice in Maine
AdministrativeProcedure:The Administrative Code in Application and Theory, 18
U. ME.L. REv. 218, 231 (1976).
2" W. VA. CODE ANN. § 29A-2-1(b) (1976 Replacement Vol.).
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would not have been expected to resist a request for a modest
appropriation to achieve what it had required. Whether any sustained effort to obtain the wherewithal to publish was ever
mounted is not known. It is true that legislatures sometimes frustrate administrative programs by denying support through the
power of the purse. The executive branch may act similarly by
refusing to request appropriations for programs it does not support,
and the impoundment controversy in recent years demonstrates
that on occasion the executive at the federal level has attempted
control of agency action by refusing to spend funds which have
been appropriated. 9 Perhaps such forces have from time to time
existed to deny the Office of the Secretary of State the funds for
publication. If they indeed have, their intensity and durability has
been remarkable. The 1964 Act has been in effect under the stewardship of five Secretaries of State, three Democratic and two
24
Republican.
1 A more likely and plausible explanation would seem
to be that no one considered the matter of sufficient importance
to muster a sustained effort to obtain the resources for publication.
For whatever reasons, good or bad, the complete legislative
scheme for public notice of final agency rules was never implemented, thus presenting the issue of what effect, if any, the absence of required pamphlets and bulletins should have on current
agency rules whose validity must be assessed on the basis of the
1964 Act. The assumption is that the agency has done all which is
required of it in connection with promulgation of its rule.
The statutory language pertaining to the effectiveness of final
rules in the 1964 Act suggests that a rule was to become effective
upon expiration of a prescribed period of time after filing of the
rule with the Secretary of State. Rules for which the agency was
required to afford public notice and participation did not become
effective "unless and until two certified copies of such rule [had]
been on file in the office of the secretary of state for thirty consecutive days.

'24

' For agencies not subject to any requirements other

23,
See generally Note, Impoundment of Funds, 86 HARv. L. REV. 1505 (1973).
20

, The Honorable Joe F. Burdett (D), 1964-65; The Honorable Robert D. Bailey
(D), 1965-68; The Honorable John D. Rockefeller IV (D), 1968-72; The Honorable
Edgar F. Heiskell IT (R), 1972-75; The Honorable James R. McCartney (R), 197577.
'I Acts of the 56th W. Va. Leg. ch. 1, § 29A-3-4, Reg. Sess. [1964] (amended
and reenacted 1976).
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than filing of final rules, identical language was used, but a sixty
day waiting period was provided.242
There is no indication on the face of the statute that publication by the Secretary of State was a condition precedent to the
effectiveness of agency rules filed with the Secretary. Nevertheless,
further inquiry beyond the express terms of the statute is warranted. It does not seem unreasonable to ask at least whether
failure to publish the requisite pamphlets and bulletins frustrated
the purpose of the system of public notice of final agency rules to
a degree which justifies a conclusion that rules adopted under the
1964 Act are invalid. For a variety of reasons, the question must
be answered in the negative. There is no ambiguity in the language
of the statute relating to effectiveness upon filing. The command
to publish is qualified by the "as soon as practicable" ' concept,
thus suggesting that the adverse consequences of failure to publish
need not reasonably result in invalidation of rules. Significantly,
publication prior to 1976 involved only final rules, notice of which
was available in the Office of the Secretary of State, although on
a less convenient basis than might have been afforded by publication. The relative infrequency of publication on a quarterly basis
suggests that it was unlikely that legal consequences were expected
to result from a failure to publish. Consequently, there is considerable basis for concluding that the unfortunate situation which existed was not tantamount to illegality.
The 1976 Amendments present significantly greater and probably insurmountable obstacles to promulgation of valid agency
rules so long as the Secretary of State has not fulfilled his responsibilities to publish and make available copies of the state register
and weekly supplements, no matter how valid his justification.
This is because of aspects of the Amendments which place greater
reliance on the state register in the operation of the rule-making
process, make greater demands of the Secretary of State, and provide unambiguous sanctions for non-compliance.
There is no uncertainty concerning when the state register was
to have been completed for duplication and distribution. The Legislature instructed that this be done within ninety days of June 7,
1976.111 Absolutely nothing was mentioned of "as soon as practica§ 29A-1-2 (1976 Replacement Vol.).
Acts of the 56th W. Va. Leg. ch. 1, § 29A-3-7, Reg. Sess. [1964] (amended
and reenacted 1976).
.2 W. VA. CODE ANN.
11

244

W.

VA. CODE ANN.

§ 29A-3-4

(1976 Replacement Vol.).
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ble." The requirement is quite reasonable, considering that the
state register is intended to provide public notice of various steps
in the rule-making process leading to final adoption. This includes
notice of proposed rule making and the time and manner in which
public rights of participation on a proposal may be exercised. The
obligation of personal notice of proposed rules, which previously
had been assigned to the agencies, was eliminated by the Amendments. Today the only legally prescribed notice must be found in
the state register. The legislative scheme cannot function at all
without publication of the register. To suggest that the agencies
themselves might still afford notice as a matter of sound practice
only ignores the fact that the minimum notice required by the
statute has not been provided. Additional responsibilities, voluntarily accepted, should not be taken as satisfactory substitutes.
The 1976 Amendments were intended to improve the quality
and availability of public notice and participation in rule making.
This is their potential. In assigning greater responsibilities to the
Secretary of State, however, there was a commensurate increase in
the consequences of inadequate or incomplete response to meet
them. The Legislature might have been satisfied to require those
with responsibilities under the amendments to do as best they
could, but it was not. The Legislature provided that "any rules or
regulations promulgated after the effective date of this section
[June 7, 1976] and any amendment promulgated hereafter to any
rule or regulation heretofore promulgated under the delegation of
the power of the legislature or otherwise shall only be effective 24if5
promulgated in accordance with the provisions of this article."
(emphasis added). Included in "this article" are the publication
obligations of the Secretary of State.
In this light, can any agency rule promulgated after June 7,
1976, and subject to the 1976 Amendments become effective prior
to a time when the state register and weekly supplements are published and available for distribution, and the relevant notices in
fact have appeared in those publications? Are rules which purport
to be lawfully adopted final rules which even may have received
the approval of the Legislative Rule-making Review Committee
actually entitled to respect, even though promulgated in the interim without benefit of a published register?
Naturally, there are practical considerations which to some
2' W. VA. CODE ANN. § 29A-3-3 (1976 Replacement Vol.).
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persons compel answers to the questions upholding the validity of
rules adopted during this period. To find otherwise means that the
rule-making process ceased to function on June 7, 1976, or at least
ninety days thereafter, pending preparation, publication, and
availability of the state register. Pragmatism is infectious in situations of this nature, leading one commentator to suggest with regard to a similar situation in Oregon that considerable latitude
should be granted and that failure to publish should be treated as
merely formal error. But even there the the issue was not failure
to publish but only the frequency of publication by the Oregon
Secretary of State within the constraints of a meager appropriation.246 The question remains whether a more practical conclusion
which allows the process to continue unencumbered by the niceties
of procedural compliance is permissible under the 1976 Amendments.
Perhaps the Legislature could have been more precise in providing for the effectiveness of rules only upon publication, as some
state legislatures have be'en.247 Yet there is little imprecision in the
statement that rules "shall only be effective if promulgated in
accordance with the provisions of this article."2'
There is language elsewhere in the article which does deserve
scrutiny in considering the impact of failure to publish. The statute describes various obligations of the agencies and in some instances the Legislature concerning their duty to file in the state
register. This duty is sometimes expressed in conjunction with
language concerning a rule's effectiveness or effective date. For
example, the Act provides that
[1] Before any rules or regulations mentioned in section
five (§ 29A-3-5) shall be effective, the agency shall29... file such
findings and determinations in the state register.
216
Hazard,

The Oregon Administrative ProcedureAct: Status and Prospects,

39 OR.L. REv. 97, 106 (1960).
E.g., CoLO. Rav. STAT. § 24-4-103(5) (1973), which provides: "A rule shall
211

become effective twenty days after publication of the rule as finally adopted
.... "; IOWA CODE ANN. § 17A.5,2.0 (Supp. 1977), which provides: "Each rule
hereafter adopted is effective thirty-five days after filing, as required in this section,
and indexing and publication as required. . .

.";LA.REv. STAT.

§ 49.954.B. (Supp.

1977), which provides: "Each rule hereafter adopted shall be effective upon its
publication in the Louisiana Register. .. "
2,6 W. VA. CODE ANN. § 29A-3-3 (1976 Replacement Vol.).
243 W. VA. CoDE ANN. § 29A-3-6 (1976 Replacement Vol.).
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[21 The agency shall file in the state register a notice of
its action. . . and a proposed effective date. . .. [S]uch proposed effective date shall not be less than thirty days after the
date of filing of such notice.Y'
[3] [T]he committee shall . . . file notice of its action in
the state register . . . . To the extent that a proposed rule or
regulation is approved by the committee it shall be effective
thirty days after the filing of notice of approval or on the effective date proposed by the agency, whichever is later .... 111
[4] [Tihe clerk of the house originating such resolution
shall forthwith file a copy thereof in the state register . . . and
any rule or regulation or part thereof made effective by such
resolution shall only be effective thirty days after such concurrent resolution is filed in the state register or upon the effective
212
date proposed by the agency, whichever is later ...
These excerpts suggest that the key to effectiveness of a rule is the
filing thereof in the state register, subject to expiration of a period
of time which in no case will be less than thirty days. Filing in the
register is the key so far as agencies are concerned. If the agency
fails to file, its rule will never become effective. However, the fact
that a rule is deemed effective for one purpose does not require that
it be effective for all purposes. Nor is it dispositive that effectiveness is not tied explicitly to publication, but is tied to filing. The
date of filing is a convenient bench-mark for measuring the time
at which a rule becomes effective. It is known and accessible to the
agency, whereas the date of publication might be less so.
Measuring effectiveness on the basis of filing date in no way
undermines the utility and significance of published notice. Since
a rule cannot become effective sooner than thirty days after filing,
there is ample opportunity for adequate and timely notice, if the
register is published with weekly supplements. This is equally true
for proposals which must provide for public participation no sooner
than thirty days after filing. Persons noting a proposal in a weekly
supplement would have adequate time, although something less
than thirty days, to prepare for and participate in the rule-making
process, if they desire. A standard based on the date of filing is
entirely compatible with the published notice which still allows
sufficient time for public response.
§ 29A-3-10 (1976 Replacement Vol.).
W. VA. CoDn ANN. § 29A-3-11(b) (1976 Replacement Vol.).

21

W. VA. CODE ANN.

2'
22

W. VA. CODE ANN.

§

29A-3-12 (1976 Replacement Vol.).
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The 1964 publication requirements were decidedly different
from the present ones, in that they applied only to final rules which
might go into effect prior to publication in a quarterly bulletin.
The 1976 publication requirements present opportunities for actual public notice and participation. The publications envisioned
under the 1976 Amendments are capable of doing much more than
providing a convenient source of information published after the
fact.
To conclude that the validity of agency rules promulgated
under the 1976 Amendments turns on compliance with the publication requirements imposed on the Secretary of State no doubt
will seem to some unduly drastic and extraordinary, especially
when the agencies have done all that is required of them. In this
light, one might accept a declaration of invalidity for failure to file
with the Secretary of State, but challenge the wisdom of a decision
of this nature when the agency is in no way at fault. The answer
to the dilemma lies in directing attention to the real issue, which
is not who has failed to meet his responsibilities under the 1976
Amendments, but rather which responsibilities have not been discharged. The full burden of providing public notice and participation in rule making is carried by no single institution of government. The 1976 Amendments provide a division of labor and responsibility among the agencies, the Secretary of State, and, to a
degree, the Legislature itself. Thus, the fact that one institution
satisfies its obligations should not have a mitigating effect in the
face of shortcomings elsewhere in the total system for notice and
public participation.
Once it is recognized that the proper focus of attention is the
nature of that which has not been done, it becomes apparent that
a decision of invalidity is a natural and proper result for which the
blameless agency unfortunately must bear the principal burden.
As we have seen, what to date has not been done under the 1976
Amendments involves providing the notice of proposed and final
rules in a state register as prescribed by the 1976 Amendments. In
situations where, for example, it has been the responsibility of an
agency to provide notice of proposed rule making, various courts
have not hesitated to declare agency action invalid when notice
was not afforded.23 The only difference in West Virginia today is
E.g., Rodway v. Department of Agriculture, 514 F.2d 809 (1975); Wagner
Electric Corp. v. Volpe, 466 F.2d 1013 (1972); Massuchusetts General Hospital v.
Comm'r of Public Welfare, 347 Mass. 24, 196 N.E.2d 181 (1964); Kneeland Liquor,
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that it is the Secretary of State, and not the agencies, who has the
responsibility to disseminate public notice."' Similarly, when publication has been required in order for a notice of proposed rule or
final rule to be effective, courts have not hesitated to find such
actions invalid. 55
Ultimately, resolution of the issue in West Virginia must turn
on legislative intent, although the author, for one, finds the language of the 1976 Amendments sufficiently clear and unambiguous
to invoke the principle that "[p]lain language should be afforded
its plain meaning. Rules of interpretation are resorted to for the
purpose of resolving an ambiguity, not for the purpose of creating
it." ' Those less comfortable with the consequences of invalidity
must somehow justify the conclusion that the Legislature could not
possibly have meant what it said.
Nevertheless, if the Legislature had intended rules to become
effective upon filing for all purposes, it might have said so in much
simpler terms.27 If publication were intended to provide informaInc. v. Alcoholic Beverage Control Comm'n, 345 Mass. 228, 186 N.E.2d 593 (1962);
Glaser v. Downes, 126 N.J. Super. 10, 312 A.2d 654 (1973); State v. Squally, 78
Wash. 2d 475, 474 P.2d 897 (Wash. 1970).
24 This analysis is relevant in cases of departures from prescribed procedure
which involve fundamental rights and responsibilities. There must be adequate
allowance for minor procedural lapses and one would expect the Supreme Court of
Appeals to accommodate them. Cf. West v. West Virginia Fair Association, 97 W.
Va. 10, 17, 125 S.E. 353, 356 (1924). In this case, the Court rejected the argument
that a clerical error rendered a public notice invalid when the notice substantially
served its purpose.
Percy v. Brennan, 384 F. Supp. 800, 813 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); City of New York
v. Diamond 379 F. Supp. 503, 518 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); Thomas v. County Office
Committee, 327 F. Supp. 1244, 1253 (S.D. Tex. 1971); Graham v. Lawrimore, 185
F. Supp. 761, 763-64 (E.D.S.C. 1960); United States v. Morelock, 124 F. Supp. 932,
944 (D.C. Md. 1954); Junghans v. Dept. of Human Resources, 289 A.2d 17, 23 (D.C.
1972); Williams v. State, 95 Iowa 5, 8-9, 501 P.2d 203, 206-07 (1972); State ex rel.
Villines v. Freeman, 370 P.2d 307, 312 (Okla. 1962) (Statute mandating filing and
publication of rules and regulations held constitutional.); Whitman v. Department
of Taxation, 240 Wis. 564, 577-78, 4 N.W.2d 180, 186 (1942) (presumption of publication applied); see Cohen, Publication of State Administrative Regulations-Reform in Slow Motion, 14 BuFF. L. REv. 410, 419-20 (1964-65).
2" Crockett v. Andrews, 153 W. Va. 714, 719, 172 S.E.2d 384, 387 (1970).
"I The fact that it did not supports the proposition that rules are to be effective
on publication, for the Supreme Court of Appeals has indicated as a general proposition that "[w]e cannot assume in the absence of wording clearly indicating
contrariwise that the Legiglature would use words that are unnecessary, and use
them in such a way as to obscure, rather than clarify, the purposes which it had in
" State ex rel. Ballard v. Vest, 136 W. Va. 80, 87, 65 S.E.2d 649, 653
mind ....
(1951).
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tion gratuitously and for no other purpose, the Legislature might
have made it a less integral part of the process. Even a cursory
examination of the 1976 Amendments suggests an overall intention
to make agency rule making a more open process, available and
accountable to the public either directly or indirectly through their
elected representatives in the Legislature. For this reason, it would
be remarkable if the 1976 Amendments were to have the effect of
providing notice of proposed rule making only at such time as the
Secretary of State finds it feasible to publish the state register, in
view of the fact that the 1964 Act at least placed an affirmative
duty on the agencies to provide notice to those requesting it. This
is the result if the publication requirements under the 1976
Amendments are interpreted as providing optional frills whose existence or non-existence has no bearing on the validity of rules. In
this light, the intent of the Legislature seems unambiguous in its
requirement that rules "shall only be effective if promulgated in
accordance with the provisions of this article," and there is reason
to believe the Supreme Court of Appeals would be receptive to this
view. In Crockett v. Andrews,25 the Court refused to permit agency
rule making by interpretation, noting that to do so would defeat
"the legislative requirement that rules may be adopted only by
compliance with
required formalities such as printing and public
distribution. ' ' '
To conclude that no valid regulation may be promulgated
until such time as there is a published state register indeed has the
2
effect of bringing agency rule-making activity to a standstill. 11
This is drastic and unfortunate, especially if failure to publish is
attributable to a lack of resources and not a deficiency in interest.
But it does not follow that the Legislature could not possibly have
intended that result. That may be precisely what was intended. 261
The suggestion has been made that to tie the validity of rules to
r'153 W. Va. 714, 172 S.E.2d 384 (1970).
211Id. at 720, 172 S.E.2d at 387.
21 One advantage of a system which relies on filing rather than publication as

a prerequisite to effectiveness of a rule is that this possibility is eliminated. A
change in Oklahoma law some years ago from a publication to a filing standard was
considered desirable by one commentator, "since there are many circumstances
that might deter publication or give rise to questions concerning its adequacy."
Merrill, Oklahoma'sNew Administrative ProcedureAct, 17 OKLA. L. Ray. 1, 17-18
(1964).

21 Cf. Comment, The Quest for Justice in. Maine Administrative Procedure:
The Administrative Code in Application and Theory, 18 U. ME.L. REv. 218, 236
(1966).
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publication rather than filing, "recognizes effective notice to the
public as an integral part of the regulation-making process," and
"[i]ts impact on the appropriation process would be clear-no
2 2
It does not seem unreasonable to suggest
money, no regulations.""
that the Legislature meant exactly what it said. To conclude otherwise requires torture of the language of the statute to a point almost beyond recognition." 3
C. Possible Justificationsfor a Finding of Validity of a Rule,
NotwithstandingProceduralIrregularities.
A hard and fast rule that agency rules be found invalid if
there have been procedural irregularaties may appear to be unreasonable and unnecessary formalism in some situations. If an
agency promulgates a rule and fails to file it as required by law,
for example, there may be reason to question a decision which
precludes enforcement of the rule against one who had full and
timely knowledge of the rule itself. In circumstances of this nature,
courts sometimes have attempted to alleviate the harsher consequences of procedural irregularity. The purpose of this section is
to consider various justifications which might be suggested to uphold rules which otherwise are procedurally defective.
Perhaps the most important consideration is the extent to
which a person had prior knowledge of the agency's rule-making
activities, even though notice was not provided in the manner
required. A prominent illustration of this principle may be found
in the Federal Administrative Procedure Act which requires (with
respect to matters required to be published in the Federal Register)
that 'Te]xcept to the extent that a person has actual and timely
notice of the terms thereof, a person may not in any manner be
required to resort to, or be adversely affected by, a matter required
to be published in the Federal Register and not so published. ' 8' °
(Emphasis added). Any document required to be published in the
Federal Register under the Federal Register Act "is not valid as
against a person who has not had actual knowledge of it.
212

O'Leary, supra note 115, at 73.

213 It does not appear that the power to adopt temporary rules in emergency

situations pursuant to W. VA. CODE ANN. § 29A-3-14 (1976 Replacement Vol.) would
provide relief in a moratorium on rule making, pending availability of the state
register. A notice of emergency rule making itself must be filed in the state register
and is limited to ninety days unless normal rule-making procedures are met,
' 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(1)(e) (1967) (emphasis added).
44 U.S.C. § 1507 (1969).
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One court refused to give effect to a regulation not published, even
in the face of actual knowlege.8 8 This approach was rejected by the
Second Circuit,8 7 and the quoted language from the Administrative Procedure Act which was added in 1967 appears to have put
the question to rest. One commentator has suggested, "[a]ctual
notice is still the best notice; the defense of nonpublication should
be denied in cases of actual notice because there was no prejudice
caused by failure to publish."2 '
These principles, although of substantial merit, are not automatically suitable for application in West Virginia, since its administrative law statutes do not contain comparable language establishing the effect of prior knowledge on the validity of rules.
What little can be gleaned from case law is not particularly illuminating. In Sheppe v. Board of Dental Examiners,2"' the Board relied on certain rules to support its case. The rules had not been
filed with the Secretary of State as required. Although the parties
had knowledge of the rules, the court concluded that the rules were
null, void and of no application whatsoever. There is language in
the case of Rinehart v. Woodford Flying Service, Inc.2° which suggests the possibility that knowledge might make a difference.
There the plaintiff had landed his aircraft in accordance with properly promulgated landing rules, unaware that the local airport
manager had adopted a local traffic rule at variance with the usual
rule. In affirming a judgment awarding damages to the plaintiff for
damages to his plane in an incident with another which was being
operated in accordance with the local rule, the court emphasized
that the plaintiff had no notice of the local rule or any instructions
to the contrary, and thus the local rule "cannot be justified as
against strangers." Presumably the result would have been different had the plaintiff had knowledge of the local traffic rule.
These two decisions suggest that there may be some situations
where knowledge should have the effect of sustaining application
Hotch v. United States, 212 F.2d 280 (9th Cir. 1954).
United States v. Aarons, 310 F.2d 341 (2d Cir. 1962); e.g., Kessler v. FCC,
326 F.2d 673, 689-90 (1963); United States v. Monroe, 408 F. Supp. 270, 275-77
(1976).
28. SCHWARTZ, supra note 12, at 181.
2"9 147 W. Va. 473, 128 S.E.2d 620 (1962).
110122 W. Va. 392, 9 S.E.2d 521 (1940).
268
267

' Id. at 396, 9 S.E.2d at 523.
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of a rule without regard to procedural irregularity and other situations where no significance will be attached to prior knowledge. It
would be intolerable, for example, to find that one such as the
plaintiff in Rinehart v.Woodford Flying Service, Inc. is entitled to
follow the properly promulgated rule when he had knowledge that
others are acting in accordance with a rule informally adopted.
Where reliance on the lawful rule would create obvious danger to
persons or property, prior knowledge should prevail over procedural regularity. The interest in encouraging procedural compliance is, in that situation, outweighed by interests of public safety.
Applying this analysis to the Sheppe case, one can understand why
a different result was justified there.
With this approach, one could expect frequent decisions of the
kind rendered by the Supreme Court of Hawaii a few years ago.
There, the Hawaii Housing Authority had failed to comply with
rule-making procedures in adopting a regulation establishing maximum income limits for continued occupancy in certain public
housing. In declaring the regulations invalid, the Court noted that
Not only were the rules in this case neither approved by the
governor nor filed with the lieutenant governor, but they suffered the more fundamental defect of having been adopted in
the absence of compliance with HRS § 91-3(a)(1) (Supp. 1973).
That section constitutes an 'explicit ... invitation to the public to participate in the formulation of ... rule[s],' 1 Cooper

189. By refusing to extend that invitation as it was thus required
to do, the HHA subverted the integrity of the rules themselves;
it is obvious that this defect, which goes to the very substance
of the rules, could not be cured merely by the2plaintiffs' 'actual
knowledge,' if any, that those rules existed."
Noteworthy is the court's emphasis on deprivation of the right of
public participation in the rule-making process as particularly relevant to a refusal to recognize knowledge as a cure to the procedural defect. As another court has noted, one cannot "presuppose
that had the Directive been published before its actual date, there
would have been no adverse comment or information furnished
which would have caused the Secretary to recall it .

.

. ."2

This

consideration is especially relevant to the West Virginia experience
under the 1976 Amendments.
272Aguiar

v. Hawaii Housing Authority, 55 Hawaii 478, 491, 522 P.2d 1255,

1264 (1974).

2 Lewis-Mota v. Secretary of Labor, 469 F.2d 478, 482 (2d Cir. 1972).
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Due regard must be given to the point that although recognition of knowledge as a bar to a determination of invalidity of a rule
does balance the equities between the parties disputing the issue,
this normally involves a corresponding sacrifice of the equities in
favor of the public at large, especially where notice of proposed rule
making is lacking. Also sacrificed is the efficacy of the incentive
which invalidation provides for compliance by the agencies. In the
absence of express statutory language in the West Virginia statute
on the knowledge issue, it is recommended that the courts can
serve these latter interests best by refusing to infer a knowledge
limitation except where essential to the protection of public safety
or health.
Another possible justification for validity notwithstanding
procedural non-compliance is the doctrine of harmless error. Federal law contains a statutory provision on the point of prejudicial
error. In a provision on the scope of judicial review over administrative action, the Federal Administrative Procedure Act provides
that
[t]he reviewing court shall ... hold unlawful and set aside
agency action ... found to be ... without observance of procedure required by law; .... In making the foregoing determinations, the court shall review the whole record... and due
account shall be taken of the rule of prejudicial error.
There remains considerable uncertainity with respect to just what
the rule of prejudicial error is,rn but it has been suggested that in
its application due regard should be given not only to protection
of the litigant in the particular case, but also to "protection for
litigants in general by securing agency adherence to those procedures which Congress has determined to be fundamental to fairness.' 'n It appears that the courts have tended to focus on harm
in the particular case rather than injury to the system in general. 7
One could carry the prejudicial error concept to the point of repealM 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1970).
2 See Note, Noncompliance with the APA as Reversible Error:The Function
of "PrejudicialError" and "Seasonable Objection" 6 STAN. L. REv. 693 (1954).
"I Id. at 700-01.
2"E.g., NLRB v. Seine and Line Fisherman's Union, 374 F.2d 974, 981 (9th
Cir. 1967); Kerner v. Celebrezze, 340 F.2d 736, 740 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382

U.S. 861 (1965); Center for Auto Safety v. Tiemann, 414 F. Supp. 215, 226 (D.D.C.
1976).
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ing requirements of published notice of proposed rule making. This
possibility has been noted and precluded."'
A rule of prejudicial error has emerged in the decisions of some
state courts, even in the absence of an express statutory provision"'
and where there was statutory guidance outside the administrative
procedure act.2s The principle is not without boundary. The Superior Court of New Jersey indicated that
In our opinion the present case is not one in which the order
should be nullified in order to secure in the future due observance of the administrative provisions of the statute before us;
nor does it involve a fundamental policy that needs vindication.
We are satisfied, after reviewing the record and the actions of
the wage board, that substantial justice was rendered here.2"'
The recognition, however, that the interests which must be considered extend beyond those of the parties in a dispute involving
procedural irregularity helps insure that the doctrine of prejudicial
error does not cause more harm than good.
No counterpart to the doctrine of prejudicial error exists in
West Virginia's administrative law statutes. If the doctrine is to
apply, the courts are left to their own resourcefulness, although the
Supreme Court of Appeals has alluded to the possibility in a recent
decision:
It is obvious that the lack of rules and regulations concerning the administering of an examination might well prejudice
an applicant who may or may not be placed in peril by having
to respond "in the blind" to examination procedures. The civil
service commission on the other hand contends that the examination was obtained from the state civil service commission and
is the same as administered throughout the State by county
civil service commissions and that they in good faith attempted
to comply with the provisions of the Act. Whether or not this is
21 See Elof Hansson, Inc. v. United States, 178 F. Supp. 922, 930 (Cust. Ct.
1959).
211See Kreshtool v. Delmarva Power and Light Co., 310 A.2d 649, 654-55 (Del.
1973); Standard "Tote" Inc. v. Ohio State Racing Comm'n, 58 Ohio Op. 337, 340,
121 N.E.2d 463, 467 (C.P. Franklin Co. 1954).
m J. Abbott & Son, Inc. v. Holderman, 46 N.J. Super. 46, 56-57, 133 A.2d 705,
710-11 (1957); Nordco, Inc. v. State, 43 N.J. Super. 277, 286-87, 128 A.2d 491, 49697 (1957); Ass'n of New Jersey State College Faculties, Inc. v. Dungan, 64 N.J. 338,
349, 316 A.2d 425, 431-32 (1974).
2' J. Abbott & Son, Inc. v. Holderman, 46 N.J. Super. 46, 57, 133 A.2d 705,
710-11 (1957).
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so, and whether or not the relators have been prejudiced by the
should be fully developed at an evidentiary hearprocedures,
282
ing.
The Legislature has also addressed the issue in other contexts.
West Virginia does have a statute dealing with harmless error in
the judicial process, 831 and the Supreme Court of Appeals has
stated that "[t]he doctrine of harmless error is firmly established
by statute, court rule and court decisions as a salutary aspect of
the law of this state." 24 It would not be unexpected to see application of the principle extended. In that event the boundaries discussed previously should apply, and the public's need for procedural compliance should be given appropriate weight.
Knowledge and the absence of prejudicial error are the principal justifications which may excuse procedural impropriety; however, there is one other which merits brief mention. It has been
suggested that "substantial administrative reliance" on an invalid
rule might justify finding actions taken thereunder valid.2 The
difficulty in this approach is that widespread application of the
principle would have the effect of sustaining the validity of invalid
rules. The problem becomes greater as the amount of time on
which the agency relied on its rule increases. A more satisfactory
resolution of the problem is that suggested in the Revised Model
State Act, which provides a two-year statute of limitations on
actions which challenge rules on grounds of procedural noncompliance.ne There is no limitation of this nature in West Virginia.
Any inclination to temper the consequences of procedural noncompliance without statutory language on point naturally springs
from a desire to avoid the "unrealistic" and "unjust" result in the
individual case. Two final points should not be overlooked by those
so inclined. First, so far as individual members of the public are
concerned, "unrealistic" and "unjust" results frequently occur as
a consequence of administrative procedure involving public notice
of agency rules. The case of Federal Crop Insurance Corp. v.
211Hall v.
Z"W. VA.

61.

2s, State

Protan, 195 S.E.2d 380, 382-83 (W. Va. 1973).
CODE ANN. § 58-1-2 (Cum. Supp. 1977). See also W. VA. R. CIv. P.

Road Comm'n v. Bowling, 152 W. Va. 688, 697, 166 S.E.2d 119, 125

(1969).
2 Mercer Council #4, New Jersey Civil Service Ass'n, Inc. v. Alloway, 61 N.J.
516, 296 A.2d 305 (1972).
- COOPER, supra note 30, at 207-08; Bonfield, supra note 20 at 874.
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Merrill"' is illustrative. There a wheat grower applied for and received crop insurance. The crop was destroyed by drought, but
recovery under the insurance agreement was denied because
barred by rules properly adopted and published in the Federal
Register. The grower had no knowledge of the rule. With respect
to the grower's predicament, Mr. Justice Frankfurter stated that
[A]ccordingly, the Wheat Crop Insurance Regulations
were binding on all who sought to come within the Federal Crop
Insurance Act, regardless of actual knowledge of what is in the
Regulations or of the hardship resulting from innocent ignorance. The oft-quoted observation in Rock Island, Arkansas &
LouisianaRailroad Co. v. United States, 254 U.S. 141, 143 that

"Men must turn square comers when they deal with the Government," does not reflect a callous outlookYu
There were equities which might have lead one in another direction. As Mr. Justice Jackson indicated in dissent:
To my mind, it is an absurdity to hold that every farmer who
insures his crops knows what the Federal Register contains or
even knows that there is such a publication. If he were to peruse
this voluminous and dull publication as it is issued from time
to time in order to make sure whether anything has been promulgated that affects his rights, he would never need crop insurance, for he would never get time to plant any crops. Nor am
I convinced that a reading of technically-worded regulations
would enlighten him much in any event.21
Nonetheless, the principle is well-established that the public will
be deemed to have constructive notice of duly promulgated administrative rules. Second, it is essential in considering justifications
for noncompliance that constructive notice is the carrot and invalidity the stick with which the Legislature intended to bring about
procedural compliance."' The effect of recognizing such justifications is to relieve the agency of much of the burden and none of
the benefits.
332 U.S. 380 (1947).
'

Id. at 385.
Id. at 387.

0 See generally Note, The FederalRegister and the Code of Federal Regulations-A Reappraisal,80 HAuv. L. Rnv. 439, 442-45 (1966).
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V.

ADMINISTRATIVE RuLE MAKING IN WEST VIRGINIA-SOME
OBSERVATIONS FOR THE FUTURE

The policies reflected in the 1976 Amendments are fundamentally sound and introduce legitimate and desirable new concepts
to the rule-making process in West Virginia. Publication of notice
through the vehicle of a state register could improve the level of
public participation in the rule-making process and the extent of
actual knowledge of final agency rules. The legislative review process raises promising possibilities of improvement in the accountability of administrative agencies for inadequacies in their rulemaking activities. Many of the problems on which this article has
focused need be no more than temporary transitional problems,
the resolution of which demands nothing more than a suitable
commitment to the principles of the 1976 Amendments.
There is every indication that both the Office of the Secretary
of State and the Legislative Rule-making Review Committee intend to devote the energy and resources to proper implementation
of the 1976 Amendments.21 There is some basis for hope that the
state register in published form will be available along with its
weekly supplements by the time this article is published. The current Secretary of State has expressed his intention to begin publication of new filings at the earliest possible date and thereafter
publish those items previously filed. 22 These efforts are needed
and welcomed.
Once publication begins, the problems which have been raised
will not disappear. The question of the validity of rules promulgated under the 1976 Amendments without benefit of publication
will remain, unless an agency elects to propose and adopt its rule
in accordance with prescribed procedures, including publication.
In addition, any rule may still be subject to questions concerning
procedural compliance; such questions, however, will arise in
21 On March 2, 1977, the author testified before the Legislative Rule-making
Review Committee concerning some of the issues discussed in this article and was
impressed with the care and attention which the Committee is giving to the matters
before it. At that meeting the Committee decided to add to its staff support.
"' Many of the issues discussed in this article first came to public attention
on February 7, 1977, at a Conference on Administrative Rule Making in West
Virginia sponsored by the West Virginia University College of Law and the West
Virginia Bar Association. On March 4, 1977, the present Secretary of State, A.
James Manchin, announced at a press conference his intention to seek $25,000 from
the Legislature to publish a weekly register. The Morgantown Morning Rep., March
5, 1977, at 8A, col. 4.
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terms of individual rules, whereas the question of the effect of the
absence of publication has application to all rules subject to basic
rule-making procedures.2"3
There is less basis for predicting the intensity of commitment
by the agencies to procedural compliance. Voluntary compliance
is preferable, and one might expect this to be the rule and not the
exception. Yet it is not unrealistic to assume that some agencies
will not take this road. In these cases it is imperative that all
available sanctions for noncompliance be invoked. To that end the
Secretary of State has the power to "refuse to accept for filing any
rules which do not comply with this chapter .

. . ."I"

and the

Legislative Rule-making Review Committee has authority to disapprove proposed rules.2"
Both the Office of the Secretary of State and the Legislative
Rule-making Review Committee can do much to bring about procedural rectitude in the rule-making process. Attorneys must be
watchful for the signs of procedural irregularity in rule making in
order that the attendant issues may be brought before the courts
for resolution. The courts in turn should give recognition to the fact
that cases concerning noncompliance with rule-making procedures
often involve basic public rights as well as those of the individuals
specifically involved. The courts must not hesitate, in appropriate
cases, to invoke the legislatively mandated sanction of invalidity
of agency rules. If each of these institutions of government and the
Bar are sufficiently alert to the necessity and utility of procedural
compliance, the interests of the ultimate beneficiaries, the public
at large, will be served well. This will be the result even if, as may
be likely, members of the public do not rise up in overwhelming
numbers to exercise their new found rights to public participation
and notice in rule making. The existence of the opportunity is as
important as its exercise.
If the requirement of a published state register or any of the
many other procedures has been unwise, impractical, or both, the
solution does not lie in sanctioning noncompliance or muddling
21 The constitutional questions raised previously concerning the legislative
review process are of less far-reaching application, since they are most likely to arise
in the context of disapproval of a proposed rule. It is anticipated that most rules
would receive legislative approval. See generally text accompanying notes 180-200
supra.
29 W. VA. CODE ANN. § 29A-2-1(b) (1976 Replacement Vol.).
= W. VA. CODE ANN. § 29A-3-11(b) (1976 Replacement Vol.).
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through at any level of government. It is not as if there were no
reasonable alternative course of action. For example, in 1945,
Pennsylvania enacted the Pennsylvania Register Act requiring
publication of administrative rules. " Immediately, opposition
arose among the agencies, primarily for the reason that it was too
expensive. The controversy was not settled in disregard of the legislative process, but within it. A bill to repeal the Act was introduced and, over substantial objection, was passed.2 Although this
early experimentation with a register was rejected in Pennsylvania, today that state does have a formal codification and publication for administrative rules in the Pennsylvania Code.us In
West Virginia the rule-making principles represented in the 1964
Act generally and the 1976 Amendments specifically are well worth
retaining and implementing. Nevertheless, repeal would be more
acceptable than ad hoc affirmation of noncompliance founded on
ill-conceived pragmatism. It is hoped and seems likely that West
Virginia will not take either extreme, but will implement and enforce the basic precepts for rule making presently provided by law.
Pa. Act of June 4, 1945, P.L. 1932 (1945) (repealed 1947).
"I Note, Publishing Practices of Pennsylvania Administrative Agencies, 36
216

TEMP. L.Q. 551, 552 (1963).
21 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 45, §§ 501-732 (Special Pamphlet 1977).
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